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I. Introduction
The early 1970s in the United States was a turbulent, rebellious period – in which
all questions were legitimate, certainly on the college campus. As the rabbinic
advisor to the Orthodox minyan at Harvard-Radcliffe Hillel, I found myself
challenged repeatedly by congregants, colleagues and friends regarding the status
of women in Jewish law and ritual. This required me, in turn, to search for honest
and appropriate explanations and rationale.  This quest has continued to preoccupy
me for more than three decades. When I first embarked on this endeavor, I did so
with a sense of confidence and commitment. As a “Halakhic Feminist,” I have
searched for ways to increase women’s involvement in Jewish spiritual and ritual
life, and I remain confident in the inherent viability of the halakhic process. But
through it all, my highest commitment has been to the integrity of Halakhah. I
firmly believe that without Halakhah as our anchor, we would rapidly lose our
direction and raison d’etre.1
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Because of these sensitivities, I picked up Tamar Ross’s recent book “Expanding
the Palace of Torah: Orthodoxy and Feminism”2 with a great deal of excitement
and anticipation. The author comes with wonderful credentials: she is an esteemed
professor of philosophy, a traditional Jewess, and a highly respected Orthodox
feminist.3 Academically, this extremely analytical, insightful, erudite and well-
documented book turned out to be highly challenging because of its interdisciplinary
nature, saturated with new jargon and concepts. But it was by no means
disappointing. Indeed, more than 300 pages later, I found myself intellectually
edified and stimulated by my newfound understanding of the history, philosophy
and theology of feminism. Prof. Ross is quite effective at outlining many of the
troubling issues concerning the status of women in Jewish law – issues that every
thinking, committed Jew should ponder. As a result, this work has received generally
laudatory reviews.4
Despite all the above, I found the book very unsettling. In her preface (p. xvii),
the author indicates that, in addition to scholars of religion and feminism, this
book is directed to two other audiences. The first group includes those who have
been sensitized by feminism but are desirous of keeping their grip on tradition.
The second audience consists of those who are firmly Orthodox, but would like to
gain greater insight into what the feminist fuss is all about.5 In short, as the title of
2 Tamar  Ross, Expanding the Palace of Torah: Orthodoxy and Feminism (Waltham, MA:
Brandeis University Press, 2004).
3 At one conference on Orthodoxy and feminism, those gathered for her lecture rose in her
honor.
4 For previous reviews, see the following: (a) Yehuda Mirsky, “An Uphill Battle,” The
Jerusalem Post, 2 September 2004. (b) Judith Tydor Baumel, “Torah for Everyone,” Ha’aretz,
3 September 2004, p. B7. (c) Yoel Finkelman, “A Critique of Expanding the Palace of
Torah: Orthodoxy and Feminism by Tamar Ross,” Edah Journal, 4:2 (2004, Kislev 5765) –
English translation of the following Hebrew article. This review is followed by a rejoinder
from Tamar Ross. (d) Yoel Finkelman, “Hitgalut le-Lo Mashma’ut,” Akdamot, 17 (Av 5765),
pp. 199-207. This review is followed by a rejoinder from Tamar Ross. (e) Malka Landau,
“A Revolutionary Encounter,” Jerusalem Report, 16 May 2005, p. 39. (f) Miriam Shaviv,
“Rethinking the Divine: Addressing the Complicated Relationship between Feminism and
Orthodoxy,” Forward, 20 May 2005. (g) Elizabeth Shanks Alexander, “Expanding the Palace
of Torah: Orthodoxy and Feminism by Tamar Ross,” Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women’s
Studies & Gender Issues, 10 (2005), pp. 243-49. (h) Daniel Reifman, “Review Essay,”
Modern Judaism, 26:1 (2006), pp. 101-108. (g) Jonathan Groner, “A Woman’s Place” –
available online at: http://www.socialaction.com/issues/human_civil/women/
womans_place.shtml.
5  For negative critiques of Orthodox feminism, see R. Nisson Wolpin and Levi Reisman,
“Orthodoxy and Feminism: How Promising a Shidduch,” The Jewish Observer (April 1997),
pp. 8-15; Levi Reisman, “Feminism – A Force that Will Split Orthodoxy?” The Jewish69
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the book suggests, Prof. Ross attempts to span the divide between Orthodoxy and
feminism. Unfortunately, I do not believe she has succeeded in this task, and this
essay is an attempt to delineate why.
II. Feminism, Halakhah and Cumulativism
The volume opens with an introduction to the philosophy and theology of feminism
and its development, proceeding next to feminism’s critique of Scripture and
Halakhah. From a feminist perspective, the belief in the divinity of the biblical text
is presumably at odds with what feminists believe to be its paternalism and male
bias. As Prof. Ross explains, feminists see evidence of bias not only in the fact that
God is referred to in male terminology, but also by the Torah’s very style and
presentation, which reflects a typically male way of viewing the world. Thus, the
Torah emphasizes action, and the primacy of law and obedience – not experience,
emotion and perception, which would have been a more feminine perspective.
Feminists are particularly troubled by the different religious roles, obligations and
privileges that distinguish between genders in Judaism. The lack of equivalence in
Jewish law, with a seeming advantage given to men in family law, personal
commandments (e.g., tzitzit, tefillin, sukkah, shofar and Torah learning) and public
rituals (public prayer, Torah reading, sheva berakhot) are also perceived as reflective
of a male bias.
To resolve the discord between feminism and Torah, Prof. Ross proposes an
approach to divine revelation that she terms “cumulativism.” She argues that the
revelation at Sinai was not a onetime event limited to the period of Moses; rather,
God continues to speak with new messages throughout history. Although the new
messages may appear to contradict the old, they do not replace them but, rather,
build on them. These fresh messages adapt, modify and transform previous
expressions of the divine will, which were appropriate for previous generations.
The novel idea of feminism, she writes, should be seen as “the manifestation of
higher moral sensibilities,” with men “voluntarily ceding the privileges of hierarchy
for the sake of greater equality and justice.” Rather than challenging traditional
Judaism, feminism should be seen as a “new revelation of God’s will.”
God’s will, maintains Ross, can be heard through the rabbinical interpretation
of Jewish texts, but also through the consensus of His people. A legal system’s
ultimate authority, she says, comes not from a set of objective rules or principles in
the text, but from the willingness of the community to understand the law in a
Observer (May 1998), pp. 37-47; R. Aharon Feldman, “Review Essay: Halakhic Feminism
or Feminist Halakha?” Tradition, 33:2 (Winter 1999), pp. 61-79.70
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certain way and live by it. Any group with an “alternative vision” of the way the
law should be interpreted can, within certain limits, decide to live it out, hoping
that they will create the conditions for wider acceptance and change. Within the
limits of what Orthodoxy deems acceptable, feminists should, therefore, simply
forge ahead with their innovations, hoping to create “facts on the ground.” 6
III. Feminism and Cumulativism: A Second Look
With all her scholarly analysis, I believe the author has obfuscated the focal point
of the discussion between feminism and Halakhah. Broadly speaking, feminism is
a doctrine about rights (zekhuyot), advocating equality of opportunity for both
genders in all spheres of life, be they social, economic, political or spiritual. It is
involved with advancing women’s viewpoint and concerns. Above all, it is deeply
preoccupied with personal autonomy and fulfillment, the freedom of the individual
to determine the directions s/he will take and the path that makes her/him happiest.
The focus of halakhic Judaism, on the other hand, is mitzvot and obligations
(hovot), which, by definition, seriously limit one’s personal autonomy and one’s
options for personal fulfillment.7 This theme of obligation was impressed upon the
Children of Israel while they were still under Egyptian servitude. The cry for
liberation was “shalah et ami ve-ya’avduni – Let my people go to serve me.”8
From its very inception, Judaism has spoken of freedom – not as an end – but as a
means to serve God.9 Religious meaningfulness for a Jew stems from an individual’s
response to the Creator’s call to duty.
Furthermore, halakhic Judaism has consistently maintained that the
fundamentals of how exactly we are to serve the Almighty were delineated in an
6 See the review of Miriam Shaviv, note 3, supra.
7 R. Isaac Breuer, Concepts of Judaism (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1974), pp. 70-
76; Justice Moses Silberg, Kakh Darko shel Talmud [Principia Talmudica] (Jerusalem:
Hebrew University Faculty of Law, 1964), pp. 66-75 – translated into English by Ben Zion
Bokser, Talmudic Law and the Modern State (New York: The Burning Bush Press, 1973),
pp. 61-70; Robert M. Cover, “Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order,” J.
Law & Religion, 5 (1987), pp. 65-74; Michael Wigoda, “Bein Zekhuyot Hevratiyot le-Hovot
Hevratiyot baMishpat haIvri,” in Zekhuyot Kalkaliyot Hevratiyot veTarbuyot beYisrael, ed.
Yoram Rabin and Yuval Shani (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2004), p. 233 – see especially
pp. 234-39; Yoram Rabin, haZekhut leHinukh veHahova leHanekh, Skirot beNosim
Mishpatiyim beZikatam laMikra, no. 175 (Ekev, 5764) – available online at: http://www.
daat.ac.il/mishpat-ivri/skirot/175-2.htm; Naama Set, “haHinukh keHovat haTsibbur,” Skirot
beNosim Mishpatiyim beZikatam laMikra, no. 219 (Ekev, 5765), note 3 and references cited
therein – available online at: http://www.daat.ac.il/mishpat-ivri/skirot/219-2.htm.
8 Exodus 7:16 and 26; 9:1 and 13. In Exodus 5:1 we also find “shalakh et ami ve-yahogu li –
Let my people go to sacrifice to me” – again a form of service.71
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immutable Sinaitic revelation 3,500 years ago. This revelation was twofold, and
was comprised of a Torah she-bi-khetav (Written Law) and a Torah she-be-al peh
(Oral Law). The former is the Pentateuch, and the Talmud indicates that its revelation
began through Moses in Egypt and Mara shortly before Sinai,10 and continued up
to Moses’ death in the plains of Moab.11  The Oral Law includes verbally transmitted
divine laws, literal and legal definitions of terms and concepts, and various logical
and hermeneutical principles designed for use in further interpretation, derivation
and expansion of the Law. The Written Law and its oral interpretive counterpart
are all considered part of the divine revelation, even though the latter has a substantial
human component in its derivation. Halakhic Judaism also affirms the reliability
of the mesora – that this oral and written tradition has been transmitted down to
our day essentially unchanged. The links in this unbroken chain of transmission of
oral traditions from Moses to the present era have been documented by Masekhet
Avot, Rav Sherira Gaon,12 Maimonides,13 Mahzor Vitri,14 Meiri,15 and modern
authors as well.16
Several critical points in the previous paragraph require further amplification.
This is because it is these points that create the incompatibility between halakhic
Judaism and much of the radical feminism propounded by Prof. Ross.
1. Firstly, halakhic Judaism, as a whole, accepts the Thirteen Maimonidean
Principles (ikkarim) of faith as its theological backbone.17 While it is true that
  9 R. Sol Roth, “Two Concepts of Freedom,” Tradition, 13:2 (Fall 1972), pp. 59-70.
10 In Egypt, see Exodus 12:1ff; Tanhuma Yashan, Genesis 11 cited in Rashi to Genesis 1:1
“Amar Rabi Yitshak.” At Mara, see Exodus 15:25; Sanhedrin 56b.
11 Gittin 60a “Amar Rabi Yohanan…” and Rashi ad loc.; Nahmanides’ Introduction to his
Commentary on Genesis.
12 R. Sherira ben Hanina Gaon, Iggeret Rav Sherira Gaon.
13 R. Moses ben Maimon, Introduction to Commentary on Mishna; R. Moses ben Maimon,
Introduction to Mishne Torah.
14 R. Simha ben Samuel of Vitri, Mahzor Vitry, sec. 424, Pirkei Avot, end of Chapter 1. See
infra, note 43.
15 R. Menahem ben Solomon haMeiri, Introduction to Bet haBehira, Avot. See also R. Shlomo
Zalman Havlin, “Seder haKabalah leRabenu Menahem haMeiri” (Jerusalem and Cleveland:
Ofeq Institute, 1992).
16 R. Judah Leib Graubart, Resp. Havalim baNe’imim, IV, sec. 86; R. Joseph Elijah Henkin,
Korei haDorot, Luah haYovel shel Ezrat Torah (1936), pp. 43-60 and additions, p. 162;
R. Raphael Halperin, Atlas Etz Hayyim (Tel Aviv: Hekdesh Ruah Yaakov, 1973-85) – twelve
out of the planned twenty volumes have thus far appeared.
17 R. Moses ben Maimon, Commentary to the Mishnah, Sanhedrin, Introduction to Chapter
10 (available online in English at: http://www.members.aol.com/LazerA/13yesodos.html).72
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various ikkarim have been disputed and modified by recognized Torah scholars
throughout the generations, these principles for the most part remain well within
the consensus and fundamentally unchanged.18 The uniqueness of Moses’ prophecy
is posited in the seventh ikkar, the assertion that the text of the Torah she-bi-khetav
is divine is formulated in the eighth, while faith in its immutability is in the ninth.
If indeed the entire Torah was accurately transmitted to Israel by Moses directly
from the Almighty, then it follows that each phrasing, each word, indeed each
letter, needs to be counted and accounted for. Every student of the Talmud is aware
of the “omnisignificance”19 of the Pentateuchal text, and knows that unnecessary
redundancies and curious formulations can have broad halakhic repercussions.
For an in-depth presentation and discussion of these principles, see R. J. David Bleich, With
Perfect Faith (New York: Ktav, 1983) and Marc B. Shapiro, infra, note 18b. These principles
are also summarized in the thirteen verses of the hymn Yigdal (available online in English at:
http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker/Yigdal.html) and the Ani Ma’amin catechism (available online
in English at: http://www.ou.org/torah/rambam.htm), which respectively open and close the
morning prayers in most Ashkenazic prayerbooks. In the Sephardic, Italian, and Yemenite
rituals, Yigdal is generally recited at the conclusion of the Friday and festival evening services.
For a comparison of the three formulations, see Marc B. Shapiro, infra, note 18b, p. 19, note
86 and references cited therein. While the authorship of Yigdal is unsure, there is consensus
that it was written in the early 14th century and entered the daily Ashkenazic liturgy in the
15th century; see Marc B. Shapiro, infra, note 18b, p. 18. The presence of Yigdal in nearly all
standard prayerbooks – irrespective of the nusah ha-tefilla – is evidence enough of the general
acceptance of the Thirteen Principles throughout Torah Judaism.
18 It should be noted that much of the disagreement of scholars with Maimonides was not on
the ultimate correctness of his creedal formulation of Jewish faith, but whether the rejection
of one of its aspects is grounds for a status of heresy with all its spiritual and halakhic
repercussions. For discussion on the binding nature of the Thirteen Maimonidean Principles,
see R.J. David Bleich, note 17, supra and the following references: (a) R. Marc. B Shapiro,
“Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles: The Last Word in Jewish Theology?” The Torah U-Maddah
Journal, 4 (1993), pp. 187-242. (b) R. Marc B. Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology:
Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles Reappraised (The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). (c) R. Gil Student, “Where Theology Meets
Halacha—A Review Essay,” Modern Judaism, 24:3 (2004), pp. 272-95. (d) R. Yitzchak
Blau, “Flexibility with a Firm Foundation: On Maintaining Jewish Dogma,” The Torah U-
Maddah Journal, 4 (2005), pp. 179-91. (e) R. Gidon G. Rothstein, Review of Marc B.
Shapiro’s The Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles Reappraised,
AJS Review, 29:1 (2005), pp. 169-71.
19 James Kugel, The Idea of Biblical Poetry: Parallelism and Its History (New Haven and
London, 1981), pp. 103-104; R. Yaakov Elman: “‘It is No Empty Thing’: Nahmanides and
the Search for Omnisignificance,” Torah U-Madda Journal, 4 (1993), pp. 1-83; R. Yaakov
Elman, “Progressive Derash and Retrogressive Pshat: Nonhalakhic Considerations in Talmud
Torah,” in Modern Scholarship in the Study of Torah: Contributions and Limitations
(Orthodox Forum Series), ed. R. Shalom Carmy (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1996), pp.
227-87, at p. 229ff.; R. Yaakov Elman, “The Rebirth of Omnisignificant Biblical Exegesis in
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” JSIJ, 2 (2003), pp. 199-249.73
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As we have seen above, however, Prof. Ross posits that what feminists perceive
as a male bias in the biblical text undermines a belief in its divinity. Unfortunately,
as Yoel Finkelman20 has noted, this and many other conclusions in this volume are
a derivative of Ross’s total acceptance of feministic values as the axiomatic given;
she then judges halakhic Judaism by them. But she does not judge feminism by the
values and givens of the halakhic tradition. The problematics she cites could well
have other interpretations and resolutions. For example, one might well have
concluded that this incompatibility indicates that the divine Torah rejects several
central temporal feminist values and perspectives.
The assertion by Ross of a male bias is difficult for several additional reasons.
The fact is that God is referred to in Hebrew as male, just as are all neutral objects
lacking female endings in their Hebrew names. While the Almighty is referred to
as a “Man of War,”21 God is also referred to as “merciful and kind.”22 To take
gender seriously in reference to God, be it male or female, is to give the Creator
physical attributes, contravening the third Maimonidean principle.23 As to the Torah’s
emphasis on action, it is consistent with the Pentateuch’s ultimate essence as a
book of law, rather than of theology or romantic history.24 In contradistinction to
most other religions, Judaism is indeed not a faith-centered religion, though it is
not without doctrine. In Judaism, one discharges God’s will primarily through action;
faith and emotion are secondary.25 To expect it to be otherwise is to misunderstand
Judaism’s essence.
Ross’s critique of the biblical text also reflects an acceptance of higher biblical
criticism,26 which echoes in turn a denial of the giving of the entire Torah to Moses
(Torah miSinai). Prof. Ross’s conception of revelation attempts to affirm the divinity
of the Torah (Torah min ha-shamayim) while accepting the historical development
that, according to the view of Biblical Criticism, was key in the creation of the
biblical text.27 According to her view, and as noted briefly above, God speaks through
20 See the reviews of Yoel Finkelman, note 4, supra.
21 Exodus 15:3.
22 Exodus 34:6 (R. Aryeh Kaplan translation).
23 “For you did not see any form” (Deut. 4:15); third Maimonidean principle, supra, note 17.
24 See the first commentary of Rashi to Genesis 1:1.
25 R. Norman Lamm, “Faith and Doubt,” Tradition, 9:1-2 (Spring-Summer 1967), pp. 14-51.
The article was reprinted in slightly more expanded form in Faith and Doubt: Studies in
Jewish Thought (New York: Ktav, 1972) pp. 1-40. See also R. Marc. B Shapiro, notes 18a
and 18b, supra.
26 See, for example, the discussion on page 223, third paragraph.
27 For additional and more detailed presentations of Prof. Ross’s views on Revelation and
Bible Criticism, see Tamar Ross, “The Cognitive Value of Religious Truth Claims: Rabbi74
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history and through concepts and ideas that the community of believers chooses to
accept.  Revelation for Ross is not necessarily something that occurred in one
period (from Egypt to the plains of Moab); rather, it is an open-ended ongoing
process. In such a system, she maintains, God’s word is often recognized
retroactively; what the people eventually accept – whether part of the initial grant
or not – becomes retroactively the word of God. Biblical Criticism is not
contradictory to such a concept of revelation, because the different layers of the
Torah are seen as different layers of revelation, and the different authors as prophets
through whom God’s word was revealed. While not denying the concept of Torah
min hashamayim, she clearly changes its definition. Presumably, Ross does not
accept the idea that the written text of the Torah was revealed only through Moses
and that it is unchanging (the seventh, eighth and ninth Maimonidean principles).28
To summarize, then, no matter how one comprehends God “speaking” and
“giving” the Torah, traditional Judaism has always understood it to have taken
place in a defined time period. It would be problematic enough to speak of new
revelations, as Prof. Ross does, since such a position is explicitly rejected by the
talmudic dicta: “The Torah is no longer in Heaven”;29 “Henceforth, a prophet may
not introduce a new matter”;30 and “Matters of Torah cannot be derived from the
words of the Prophets.”31 If this is the ruling of tradition regarding bona fide
prophecy, how much more would this be true in the case of “revelations” of uncertain
origin. But this issue aside, Prof. Ross does not even affirm the uniqueness of the
original Sinaitic revelation, nor does she require that it be an actual event. This
alone would render Tamar Ross’s novel position, to say the least, very problematic
for halakhic Jewry.
A.I. Kook and Postmodernism,” in Hazon Nahum: Studies in Jewish Law, Thought, and
History Presented to Dr. Norman Lamm on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, ed.
R. Yaakov Elman and R. Jeffery S. Gurock (New York: Yeshivah University Press, 1997),
pp. 479-527 – republished in Hebrew in Akdamot (Jerusalem: Bet Morasha, 2000); Ilana
Goldstein Saks also reports on her conversations on this matter with Prof. Ross in her paper
“Encounters between Torah Min Hashamayim and Biblical Criticism,” The Atid Journal
(1998), available online at: http://www.atid.org/journal/journal98/saks_sum.asp.
28 See Ilana Goldstein Saks, ibid. R. Yitzchak Blau, note 18d, supra, bottom of page 180
therein, indicates that Ross denies the significance of dogmas in Judaism altogether.
29 Bava Metzia 59b; Temura 16a; Jerusalem Talmud,  Moed Katan 3:1; Maimonides, Introduction
to Commentary on Mishna, s.v. “veHineni”; Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei haTorah, 9:1.
30 Yoma 80a; Megilla 2b and 3a; Temura 16a. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei haTorah 9:1;
R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes, Kol Kitvei Maharatz Hayyot, I, Torat Nevi’im, Chapter 1 (Eile haMitzvot).
31 Hagiga 10b; Bava Kamma 2b; Nidda 23a. Encyclopedia Talmudit, VII, Divrei Kabbala,
p. 106, at p. 112, sec. 3. R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes, Kol Kitvei Maharatz Hayyot, I, Ma’amar
Torat haNevi’im Divrei Kabbalah.75
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2. The aforementioned centrality of the mitzvah leads us to our second point. The
mitzvot revealed to Moses were not the same for Jew and gentile; nor were they,
for that matter, identical for all Israelites. This lack of identity in religious obligation
creates various different religious roles. All Jews share the same level of kedushat
Yisrael, Jewish sanctity.32 Nevertheless, Jewish law distinguishes between the
obligations of kohanim (priestly clan), leviyim (Levites) and yisraelim (other
Israelites), as well as between males and females.33 In particular, women were
generally freed from the mitzvot asei she-ha-zeman grama (time-determined positive
commandments) which include, inter alia: sukkah, lulav, shofar, tefillin and tzitzit.34
In none of the halakhic sources do we find any doubt, question or dispute as to
women’s fundamental exemption from mitzvot asei she-ha-zeman grama.
Furthermore, we find no historical evidence indicating that women as a group ever
acted otherwise at any time in Jewish history.35 On the contrary, until the Middle
Ages, it was rare for women to voluntarily perform a time-bound commandment.36
This exemption is derived in the Oral Law through the use of the hermeneutical
principals,37 and is therefore deemed to be biblical in origin. This must be the case
since the rabbis lack the authority to exempt women from commandments that the
Torah itself obligates them to perform.38 Thus, if women are exempt from performing
32 For further discussion, see Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, “Women’s Prayer Services:
Theory and Practice. Part 1 – Theory,” Tradition, 32:2 (Winter 1998), pp. 5-118, text
following note 25. PDF file available online at: http://www.jofa.org/pdf/Batch%201/
0021.pdf.
33 R. Saul F. Berman, “The Status of Women in Halakhic Judaism,” Tradition, 14:2 (Fall
1973), pp. 5-29.
34 See Mishna Kiddushin 1:7; Tosefta Kiddushin 1:10; Talmud Kiddushin 29a, and Kiddushin
33b and ff.
35 Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin 96a and Jerusalem Talmud, Berakhot 2:3 record that Michal
the daughter of Saul was notable in that she wore tefillin, while the wife of Jonah would
make the triannual pilgrimage.
36 See R. Israel M. Ta-Shma, Halakha, Minhag, uMetziut beAshkenaz (1000-1350) (Jerusalem:
Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2000), p. 265.
37 Kiddushin 34a.
38 A reviewer has challenged this assertion by noting that the rabbis indeed have the authority
to abrogate positive Toraidic commandments by requiring inaction. For references and
discussion, see “Yesh ko’ah bi-yad hakhamim la’akor davar min haTorah,” Encyclopedia
Talmudit, XXV, pp. 607-57. Classic examples are the prohibition against sounding the shofar
or shaking the lulav on the Sabbath; see Rosh haShana, 29b and Sukkot 44a.  This precedent
is irrelevant, however, to women’s exemption from time-determined positive commandments,
for three reasons. Firstly, use of this rabbinic authority is restricted to a limited number of
instances in which fulfillment of the commandment might lead to widespread violation of a
serious Toraidic injunction; see R. Zevi Hirsch Chajes, Kol Kitvei Maharitz Hayyot, Torat76
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time-bound mitzvot, as Jewish law indeed maintains, then obviously the exemption
itself must be Toraidic. Moreover, Maimonides cogently argues that this exemption
is rooted in ancient oral tradition.39 The bottom line, then, is that halakhic Judaism
maintains that God Himself ordained and commanded non-identical roles for men
and women.
This clearly does not sit well with feminists. Ross uncritically cites Plaskow,
that this is “a profound injustice of the Torah itself in discriminating between men
and women” (p. 118), while Ozick believes that the status of women is not an
essential feature of Judaism and “is by no means a ‘theological’ question” (p. 103).
One resolution is to deny that women’s exemption from time-determined positive
commandments is divine, but this violates Maimonides’ eighth ikkar. Ross would
prefer to believe “that Halakhah was born in a broader sociocultural context” (p.
35).
As Orthodox Jews, we believe that the Torah was not born but divinely revealed;
it is eternal, and, hence, not resonant of a particular sociocultural context. Since
the Torah is immutable, so is gender-related religious obligation. In fact, this lack
of equivalence was extended further by the rabbis of the Talmud who followed the
Torah’s lead in their edicts (kol de-takun rabbanan, ke-ein de-oraita takun).40 Thus,
according to most halakhic authorities, Hazal generally freed women from time-
determined rabbinic commandments as well,41 though there are various exceptions.42
haNevi’im, Hora’at Sha’ah, sec. 6, pp. 37-38. Thus, sounding the shofar or shaking the
lulav on the Sabbath might lead to carrying these ritual items on the Sabbath in the public
domain – a prohibition that carries corporal punishment. Secondly, rabbinic scholars have
emphasized that the Toraidic commandment is never abrogated. Rather, Hazal direct one
not to perform a particular mitzvah action under certain limited circumstances. See R. Zevi
Hirsch Chajes, ibid.; R. Elhanan Bunim Wasserman, Kovetz Shiurim, II, Kuntres Divrei
Soferim, sec. 3; R. Jacob Israel Kanievsky, Kehillot Ya’akov, Berakhot, sec. 8. However,
women were completely exempted from time-determined positive commandments. Finally,
Hazal used their authority to prohibit the performance of a mitzvah; however, women are
only exempted – not excluded – from fulfilling time-determined mitzvot. Indeed, these
mitzvot remain optional for any woman who wishes to carry them out.
39 R. Moses ben Maimon, Commentary to Mishna, Kiddushin 1:7.
40 Pesahim 30b and 116b; Yoma 31a; Yevamot 11a; Gittin 64b and 65a; Avoda Zara 34a.
41 Inter alia: Tosefot, Berakhot 20b, s.v. “beTefilla”; Tosefot, Pesahim 108b, s.v. “sheAf.”
R. Solomon ben Isaac (Rashi), Berakhot 20b, s.v. “veHayyavin beTefilla” seems to dissent.
See Encyclopedia Talmudit, II, “Isha,” p. 247; R. Isaac Arieli, Einayyim laMishpat, Berakhot
20b, s.v. “deRahamei ninhu.”
42 Thus, women are rabbinically commanded in private prayer because it is “a request for
mercy” (Berakhot 20b and Tosefot ad loc., s.v. “beTefilla”), which women require from the
Almighty no less than men. Similarly, they are required to read Megillat Esther (Megilla
4a), light Hanukka candles (Shabbat 23a), and drink the four cups of wine at the Passover77
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For those whose highest commitment is to Halakhah, this lack of identity in religious
roles is, once more, a resounding rejection of certain basic feminist values. It
suggests that the Torah’s set of priorities is not always consonant with those of
modern-day radical feminism. Ross acknowledges this on page 94, but sides with
feminism.
3. The Torah she-be-al peh is primarily concerned with the transmission of oral
traditions and the interpretation of the Torah she-bikhtav. A Jew’s faith in the
accuracy and objectivity of the oral tradition is expressed in the eighth and ninth
principles of Maimonides. In this regard, Prof. Ross is strongly influenced by
“Feminist Relativism.” This school maintains that since the Halakhah was
interpreted and transmitted (predominantly43) by males – one can assume that it is
not accurate and dispassionate, but reflects a male perspective. What’s more, had
the Torah been transmitted and interpreted by women, it would have been
substantially different – presumably more sympathetic to women and more resonant
with their sensitivities. Ultimately, such a position challenges the objectivity and
authenticity of the entire mesora – the transmission of Torah and Halakhah from
Moses down to our very day – in all aspects, gender-related or not.44  For if we are
seder (Pesahim 108a/b) “she-af hen hayu be-oto ha-nes” (because they [women], too, were
included (or involved) in the same miracle [of salvation]).” Consequently, women must
thank and praise the Lord as do their male counterparts. As an aside, we note that Prof. Ross
translates “she-af hen hayu” as “they too were witness to the same miracle” (see p. 16 first
line; note 43, p. 255; and note 18 on p. 280). From the Jerusalem Talmud (Megilla 2:5),
Rashbam (Pesahim 108b, s.v. “sheAf”), Tosefot (ibid., s.v. “sheAf” and s.v. “hayu”) and
other rishonim, it is clear that it was the women’s involvement as participants or protagonists
in the events that is the reason for their obligation.
43 Interestingly, R. Simha ben Samuel of Vitri, Mahzor Vitry, sec. 424, Pirkei Avot, end of
Chapter 1, lists the prophetesses Deborah and Hulda as links in the chain of tradition.
44 It is very important to note that the aforementioned mesora contains two types of derashot
(hermeneutical derivations): midrash mekayem (supportive derivations, also referred to as
halakha kadma li-derash) and midrash yotzer (creative derivations, also referred to as derash
kadam le-halakha). A very large percentage of Halakhah was passed orally from generation
to generation uncontested, but without an explicit source. In this case, the midrash mekayem
is suggesting a possible source; but there never was any doubt about the law’s correctness –
which may well go back to Sinai. At other times, Hazal used the thirteen hermeneutical
principles to expand into new areas – midrash yotzer. See Jacob Nachum Epstein, Mevo’ot
leSifrut haAmoraim (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1962); Ezra Zion Melamed, Pirkei Mavo LeSifrut
HaTalmud (Jerusalem: Galor, 1973); Menachem Elon, haMishpat haIvri (Jerusalem: Hebrew
University Magnes Press, 3rd edn., 1988); Menachem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources,
Principles (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1994). From what Tamar Ross
claims, everything is suspect.78
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to follow this logic, then an affluent scholar should come under suspicion regarding
his rulings on the poor, and vice versa. If he were a farmer, then he should be
deemed unreliable when it comes to agricultural laws. Nonetheless, the Torah has
explicitly commanded us to heed the words of the rabbinic scholars who are the
ma’atikei ha-shemua, the transmitters of tradition and the Oral Law.45
Prof. Ross, throughout this work, indeed challenges Hazal’s authority as
interpreters of the Torah, and/or contests the accuracy of the transmission of the
oral tradition. For example, on page 88, Ross is troubled by Hazal’s exclusionary
reading of the word “ben” as referring to a son, rather than a daughter.46 In a related
instance, on page 89, she challenges Maimonides’ barring women from being
appointed as queen.47 Note 61 thereto makes it clear that she is aware that the
source of this ruling is explicitly derived in the Sifre, “melekh – ve-lo malka”;48 but
that doesn’t prevent her from concluding that the exclusion is arbitrary. The binding
authority of every such derasha requires, to her mind, a rationale or explanation
that she can accept. The divinity of the derasha or its interpretive accuracy is
irrelevant. What’s more, the institutional authority of Hazal also has little force.
This confrontational stance with regard to Hazal’s derashot places her beyond the
pale of Orthodoxy and traditional Torah Judaism.49
45 Deuteronomy 17:11; Maimonides, Sefer haMitzvot, Asei 174 and Lo Ta’ase 312 (the
transmitters of the oral tradition are referred to as ba’alei ha-kabala); Maimonides,
Introduction to his Commentary on the Mishna (ma’atikei ha-shemua); Maimonides,
Introduction to the Mishne Torah (ha-ma’atikim Torah she-be-al peh); Mishne Torah, Hilkhot
Mamrim 1:1-2; Nahmanides, Commentary to Deuteronomy 17:11; Hinukh, Commandment
495. This subject was developed extensively by R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik; see “Keviat
Moadim al pi haReiyah veAl Pi haHeshbon,” Or haMizrach, Gilyon haMeah (Tishrei-Tevet
5741), pp. 7-24, sec. 7 at pp. 20-21; “Shenei Sugei Masoret,” in Shi’urim leZekher Aba
Mori z”l, I, pp. 220-39; “Kevi’at Mo’adim al Pi haReiya ve-al Pi haHeshbon,” in Kovetz
Hiddushei Torah – haGram ve-haGrid Soloveitchik, pp. 47-65, at p. 59ff.; Iggerot haGrid
haLevi, Hilkhot Kiddush haHodesh 5:1-2, secs. 8-9, pp. 86-88; cited by R. Zvi (Hershel)
Schachter, Nefesh haRav (Jerusalem: Reishit Yerushalayyim, 1994), p. 34ff.
46 The reason is simple: if the text had not wanted to exclude a daughter, it could have used the
non-gendered term “zera” (seed). See Encyclopedia Talmudit, Vol. 3, “Ben.” R. Meir Leibush
Malbim, haCarmel, “Ben Bat.”
47 Mishne Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:5.
48 Deuteronomy 17:15, Sifre ad loc., piska 157.
49 See Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Hilkhot Teshuva III:8, who includes under those who deny
the Torah (ha-kofrim baTorah) those who deny the authority of Hazal as interpreters of
Torah (ve-ha-makhish magideha). In this regard, see the transcribed remarks of R. Joseph B.
Soloveitchik entitled “Talmud Torah and Kabalas Ol Malchus Shamayim” – available online
at: http://mail-jewish.org/rav/talmud_torah.txt; R. Zvi (Hershel) Schachter, Nefesh haRav
(Jerusalem: Reishit Yerushalayyim, 1994), p. 37; and the sources cited in note 45, supra.79
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Even if Ross were to admit that the Torah she-bikhtav and Torah she-be-al peh
were passed on loyally (which she doesn’t), she would (and does) charge that later
decisions are biased and suspect because the rabbis, poskim and codifiers were
male. In this regard we note that there is a general belief in Torah Judaism that
Halakhah, as it is today, did not take a “wrong turn” and that it correctly reflects
retzon haBorei (the will of the Creator). What’s more, while Judaism never claimed
rabbinic infallibility, it has long maintained that there is an element of divine
guidance in the course of Jewish law.50 Thus, even if it were to occur that the ruling
of a particular halakhic authority was incorrect – despite his honest search for
truth51 – the sincere give and take of the halakhic system itself would correct the
deviation. It is for this reason that the mesoret ha-pesak – the flow of halakhic
decision-making – while not singularly conclusive, does, nonetheless, carry much
weight with halakhic authorities.
Besides, the suggestion that Halakhah would be different if we had women
rabbis and scholars is belied both by theory and fact. Prof. Steven Fridell’s study
reveals that even though women have little day-to-day input in the development of
Jewish law, Halakhah incorporates the major components of what would be “female
jurisprudence.”52 In addition, over three decades of personal experience indicates
50 See Bava Batra 12a “[Prophecy] was not taken from the scholars” and the comments of
Nahmanides and Ritva ad loc.; Rabbi Judah haLevi, Kuzari 3:41; Nahmanides, Num. 11:16
and Deut. 17:11; R. Samuel ben Ali, cited in S. Assaf, Tarbitz, 1:2 (1930), pp. 64-66 (cited
in Lawrence Kaplan, “Da’as Torah: A Modern Conception of Rabbinic Authority,” in
Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy [Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1992], pp. 1-
60, note 68); Shiltei Giborim to Mordekhai, Shabbat, Chapter 2, sec. 265, no. 5; R. Jonathan
Eibeschutz, Urim veTumim, H.M., sec. 25 on Kitzur Tekafo Kohen (nn. 123-24), 48b;
R. Zadok haKohen of Lublin, Mahshevet Harutz, pp. 6a-b; R. Moses Sofer, Resp. Hatam
Sofer, E.H., II, no. 102, s.v. “laZeh”; R. Hayyim Halberstam, Resp. Divrei Hayyim, Y.D., II,
sec. 105; R. Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz, Letters of Hazon Ish, 1:15 and 2:14; R. Avraham
Yeshayahu Karelitz, cited by R. Zvi A. Yehuda, “Hazon Ish on Textual Criticism and
Halakhah,” Tradition, 18:2 (Summer 1980), pp. 172-80, at p. 175: “The hand of Providence
must be seen in the historical evolution of halakha”; R. Moses Shternbuch, Mo’adim
uZemanim, IV, sec. 274, s.v. “u-veYoter halo”; R. Yaakov Elman, “Progressive Derash and
Retrogressive Pshat: Nonhalakhic Considerations in Talmud Torah,” in Modern Scholarship
in the Study of Torah: Contributions and Limitations (Orthodox Forum Series), ed. R. Shalom
Carmy  (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1996), pp. 227-87, at p. 242 ff. R. Yaakov Tendler
reported to R. Dov I. Frimer in 1972 that this was also the view of his sainted grandfather,
R. Moses Feinstein.
51 For a discussion on how to determine an honest search, see supra, notes 1a and 1b.
52 Steven F. Fridell, “The ‘Different Voice’ in Jewish Law: Some Parallels to a Feminist
Jurisprudence,” Indiana Law Journal, 67 (1992), pp. 915-49. I thank Joel B. Wolowelsky
for bringing this article to my attention.80
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that, like men, the more serious a talmida hakhama (or talmidat hakham) a woman
becomes, the greater her confidence in the integrity of Halakhah and her
commitment to the halakhic system.52*
4. As should by now be clear, Ross’s “cumulativism” certainly cannot be
entertained by an Orthodox Jew who accepts Torah miSinai and the immutability
of Torah. Indeed, her theology closely resembles that of the Conservative movement,
with her conception of cumulative revelation more strongly linked to Solomon
Schechter’s notion of “Catholic Israel” (and some of its later reformulations)53
than with Orthodox ideology. As the ninth Maimonidean principle teaches, “the
Torah will never be abrogated... and nothing will be added to it or detracted from
it, neither in the Written Torah nor in its [orally transmitted] interpretation (lo ba-
katuv ve-lo ba-peirush), as it says, ‘...you shall not add to it, nor diminish from it’
(Deuteronomy 13:1)”.54 Retzon Hashem (God’s will) is unchanging, since God is
unchanging. The Shelah (R. Isaiah Horowitz), cited by Ross on page 197, who
speaks of the voice of God that is unceasing, is referring to the ever-increasing
insights that we obtain into the original Sinaitic revelation through the ongoing
interpretive process.55  The revelation is expanding in the sense of new insights
and applications of the originally revealed rules and principles – but not that there
are radically new rules and novel principles being revealed. Right on point is the
52* See relevant comments of Aviad Stollman, “Review Essay: ‘A Lifetime Companion to the
Laws of Jewish Family Life,’ by Deena R. Zimmerman,” Meorot, 6:1 (Shevat 5767), p. 4ff.
53 Seymour Siegel, “The Meaning of Jewish Law in Conservative Judaism: An Overview and
Summary,” in Conservative Judaism and Jewish Law, ed. Seymour Siegel with Elliot Gertel
(New York: Rabbinical Assembly, 1977), pp. 13-26; Neil Gillman, Conservative Judaism:
The New Century (Springfield, NJ: Behrman House, Inc., 1993); Elliot N. Dorff, Conservative
Judaism: Our Ancestors to Our Descendants (New York: United Synagogue, 1996).
54 R. Moses ben Maimon, note 17, supra. This is the reading in the Kafah edition (Jerusalem:
Mosad haRav Kook, 5763-5767); however, the standard Al-Harizi translation reads “...neither
in the Written Torah nor in the Oral Law (lo baTorah she-bi-khtav ve-lo baTorah she-be-al
peh).” On the question of which aspects of rabbinic tradition qualify as divine Oral Law
according to Maimonides, see R. Gerald J. Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution in
Maimonides,” in The Thought of Moses Maimonides: Philosophical and Legal Studies, ed.
Ira Robinson, Lawrence Kaplan and Julien Bauer (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press,
1990), pp. 167-82.
55 This formulation of the Shelah is stated explicitly by R. David ben Moses of  Navardok,
Galya Massekhet, II (Derush), folio 42a-c and by Savi Mori zt”l, R. Moses Zev Kahn,
Introduction to Resp. Tiferet Moshe (Chicago: 1953), p. 6. This view also finds clear
expression in the writings of other scholars: R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes, Hiddushei Maharitz
Hayyot, Megilla 19b; R. Barukh haLevi Epstein, Torah Temima, Exodus 24:12, note 28;
R. Jacob Ariel, Introduction to Resp. beOhala shel Torah, II, O.H., pp. 7-8.81
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talmudic statement: “Even that which a distinguished student will teach in the
future before his teacher has been said to Moses at Sinai. And why do I need to
know this? Because someone will come along and say: ‘See this new revelation!’
His fellow should respond to him: ‘This has been revealed long ago.’”56
Tamar Ross is not unaware of the clash between “cumulativism” and the ninth
ikkar. Indeed, she repeatedly cites Marc Shapiro’s encyclopedic work on the Thirteen
Maimonidean ikkarim57 to demonstrate that, although these principles are now
commonly viewed to be accepted in Orthodoxy, they were not always so.  However,
as noted above, the challenges to these principles have for the most part been
minor. Furthermore, these challenges have nothing to do with the ninth ikkar.  Those
who dispute the Rambam, such as R. Joseph Albo and R. Jacob Emden,58 claim
that God “could” have another revelation, not that another has ever occurred.
Furthermore, this new revelation is contingent on its being relevant to the whole
nation, similar to that of ma’amad har Sinai. But, as discussed above, Ross’s
understanding of revelation is not the same as that of R. Emden and R. Albo.  She
sees revelation in terms of individuals arriving at a new ethical understanding.
From Ross’s perspective, the Torah was never really given at any moment in time.
The Torah, the divine will, is continually changing, as each generation sees its
truth in the Torah.59
Whether or not Prof. Ross’s theology is ultimately judged to be within the
ambit of Orthodoxy, it is certainly not what has historically been understood as
traditional dogma even in its broader sense.
5. We closed Section II with Ross’s assertion that within the limits of what
Orthodoxy deems acceptable, feminists should simply forge ahead with their
innovations, hoping to create “facts on the ground.” This is consistent with her
view (page 43) that the validity of Torah comes – not from its divinity – but from
the fact that people accept it. Rejecting just such an approach is the noted posek,
56 Jerusalem  Talmud,  Pe’ah 2:6. Similar statements are found in the Babylonian Talmud,
Megilla, 19b and Safra, Leviticus 25:1. See also R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Resp. Tzitz Eliezer,
Introduction to Vol. XIV; R. Jehiel Mikhel Epstein, Arukh haShulkhan, O.H., 588, sec. 9.
57  See note 18a and b, supra. The author would like to thank Prof. Marc Shapiro for clarifying
for me many of the issues raised regarding the Maimonidean Ikkarim.
58 R.  Joseph  Albo,  Sefer haIkkarim, III:13-20; R. Jacob Emden, Migdal Oz, secs. 26b-c. For
discussion, see Marc Shapiro, notes 18 and b, supra.
59 See references in note 27, supra, and Tamar Ross, “Reflections on the Possibilities of
Interfaith Communication in our Day,” Edah Journal, 1:1 (Marheshvan 5761). We have
already cited Yitzchak Blau’s assertion, note 28, supra, to the effect that in actuality Prof.
Ross denies the significance of dogmas in Judaism altogether.82
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R. Moses Feinstein, who comments:60
Indeed, all women are permitted to perform even those
commandments that the Torah did not obligate them [to do], and they
have fulfilled a mitzvah and [receive] reward for the performance of
these commandments... Nevertheless, it is obvious that this is so only
if her soul desires to fulfill mitzvot even though she is not commanded
[to do so]. However, since her intention is not such, but rather, she is
motivated by her grievance with God and His Torah, her deed is not
to be considered a mitzvah-action at all, but, on the contrary, a
forbidden action. For she is violating the prohibition of heresy – since
she thinks that the laws of the Torah are subject to change – [not only
in thought, but] also in deed, which is [all the more] serious.
That a prominent and sensitive halakhic authority such as R. Feinstein would
characterize the type of behavior advocated by Prof. Ross as heresy must carry
great weight with any Jew seriously concerned with Jewish law.
IV. Ross’s Critique of Halakhah
Prof. Ross’s mastery is in philosophy; nevertheless, much of the book deals with a
scathing critique of Halakhah. Unfortunately, the citations in this section of the
book are overwhelmingly from secondary sources, strongly suggesting that she
has little first-hand acquaintance with the primary sources she is citing or critiquing.
This is borne out by the plethora of serious errors that will be detailed in the next
section. She is untrained in legal distinctions, and repeatedly attacks a legal system
whose workings and methodology she does not seem to fully understand.61  She
demands a single explanation for a broad spectrum of laws regarding women,
appearing to be insensitive to the complexities and nuances of both law and life.62
In addition, from its title, this tome is presumably about Orthodoxy and feminism.
Hence, it is somewhat surprising that Ross does not hesitate to rely extensively on
–  and reference works authored by – those whose theology is anything but Orthodox,
i.e., who reject the binding and divine nature of Torah she-bikhtav and Torah she-
be-al peh.
When she discusses feminism, her presentation is for the most part respectful
and uncritical. While the author asks many thoughtful and probing questions, she
is most often unwilling to seriously consider the answers tradition has to offer. On
60 R. Moses Feinstein, Resp. Iggerot Moshe, O.H., IV, sec. 49.
61 The second paragraph on p. 87 is a classic example.
62 See the discussion on page 94 and elsewhere.83
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the contrary, in the clash between feminism and Halakhah, one perceives a clear
bias against Halakhah. When it comes to the traditional stance, she is negative,
critical and one-sided. Her language is charged, and at times derogatory. She will
cite minority rabbinic opinions, no matter how marginal they may be, which buttress
her claim of a bias against women in Halakhah – despite a sympathetic majority
position. She often references positions she finds distasteful, although they find no
expression in the way Judaism is lived or practiced today.
Throughout her critique of Halakhah, Tamar Ross repeatedly confuses the law
with its proposed rationales. The latter are merely non-binding suggestions, human
attempts to understand the divine edict. Proposed rationales may contradict each
other and shift from one society and culture to another – while the Halakhah remains
non-fluxional. As a result of this confusion, Prof. Ross seems to believe that if she
can succeed in refuting or placing in question a proposed rationale, she will have
effectively undermined the specific Halakhah, which is then no longer binding or
relevant. (We will return to this issue in point 14 below.)
She is focused on asking questions – many good ones – but less receptive to
seriously considering the answers of tradition – many good ones – to these very
questions. The few explanations she does cite, often only in the endnotes, are usually
categorized as “apologetics,” to be understood as lame defenses to valid questions.
The feminist analysis is her given starting point; hence, the response of Jewish
tradition, no matter how cogent, can never prevail against the feminist critique.
While apologetics in the service of Jewish tradition are looked down upon, Ross
believes that they can readily be enlisted into the service of feminism, “enabling
the transition from one generation and mind-set to another” – namely, from one
less sympathetic to feministic values to another more sympathetic.
Furthermore, she has difficulty with the halakhic process as well. “The problem
is,” writes Ross, “... the selective reading of present day Orthodoxy, which prefers
to ignore all those Midrashic sources that speak, for example, of the role that Moshe
Rabbenu’s active input ... had in transmitting the word of God.” In addition, “...the
decisions of posekim regarding when to employ ‘the open playfulness of midrash
aggadah’ ... and when to limit themselves only to close readings of texts and their
minutiae are themselves judgments that posekim make daily.” But, contrary to her
charge,63 the rules are quite clear – and what she observes as a close reading of the
63 Not surprisingly, Conservative Jewish scholars, as well, have prided themselves on involving
midrash aggada in pesak; see Seymour Siegel, supra, note 53. As far as her reference to
Moshe Rabbenu’s active input in transmitting the word of God, all authorities agree that
nothing was included in the Torah without God’s direction. See discussion of R. Marc Shapiro,
supra, note 18b, p. 113 and note 165.84
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sources is by no means a “modern” phenomenon. When it comes to interpretations
of the biblical text that have no halakhic repercussions, there is no fixed or binding
tradition. Hence, each scholar – indeed, each individual – can be “playful” and
creative with the text.64  However, when the interpretations affect law and practice,
the readings must be careful and close, and correspond to halakhic tradition – for
we are attempting to determine the divine will of how we should act.  It is for this
very reason that Hazal themselves ruled that “one may not learn [Halakhah] from
aggada.”65
And this brings us to a more fundamental point.66  In the absence of prophecy,
the halakhic process is Man’s attempt to try and discover the divine will – retzon
haBorei. The utilization of the rules of pesak, as well as their application to a
particular case, is based on tradition and close intellectual analysis. In addition,
relevant precedent needs to be reviewed and scrutinized. Admittedly, since we are
dealing with human beings, what one considers to be “the proper” understanding
of the rules and precedent is often a matter of discretion and subjective preference.
One cannot always prove that one’s analysis or interpretation is the absolutely
correct peshat. Nonetheless, one’s analysis and understanding are always subject
to peer review by other talmidei hakhamim, and can be either confirmed or rejected
– as with any academic discipline. In this context, consensus and “rov poskim” is
often invoked as an indication that a certain approach or result is the more compelling
view66* – even though majority is not always an absolute arbiter or guarantor for
64 R. Samuel haNagid, Mevo haTalmud, s.v. “veHagada”; R. Hai Gaon and R. Sherira Gaon,
Otzar haGeonim, Perushim, Hagiga 14a; R. Abraham ben Moses Maimonides, Ma’amar
al Derashot Hazal, s.v. haHelek haRevi’i; R. Moses ben Nahman (Nahmanides), Vikuah
haRamban – Milhamot haShem (Chavel edition), sec. 39 and notes of R. Chaim David
Chavel thereto; R. David Kimhi, Samuel I, 28:24; R. Isaac Abravanel, Samuel II, 11:3;
R. Hayyim ben Atar, Or haHayyim, Deuteronomy 32:1; Rashbam, Ibn Ezra, R. Isaac Caro
(Toldot Yitzhak), Abravanel and R. Bahya to Deuteronomy 26:5 (arami oved avi) and related
discussion of R. Isaac Lampronti, Pahad Yitzhak, “Avraham ben Ezra”; R. Yosef Eliyahu
Henkin, cited by R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin, Equality Lost (Jerusalem: Urim, 1999/5759),
p. 6; Encyclopedia Talmudit, I, Aggada, sec. 4, p. 132 and references cited therein. See also
R. Samuel Shtrashon, Hagahot Reshash, Shabbat 70b. Two dissenting opinions who maintain
that the aggadic statements of Hazal are also based on oral tradition are R. Elijah Mizrahi,
Deuteronomy 26:5 and R. David Ibn Zimra, Resp. Radvaz, IV, sec 232.
65 Jerusalem Talmud, Pe’ah 2:6; Jerusalem Talmud, Hagiga 1:8. See also Encyclopedia
Talmudit, I, Aggada, sec. 4, p. 132; Aryeh Abraham Frimer, “beHagdarat haNes sheAlav
Mevarkhim birkat haNes,” Or haMizrach, 31, 3-4 (110-111, Nisan-Tammuz 5743), pp. 308-
22, at p. 317, s.v. “Amnam.”
66 See discussion in Aryeh A. Frimer, supra, note 1a.
66* See Hinukh, Commandment 78; R. Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz, Hazon Ish, Zera’im, sec.
1, no. 1.85
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absolute truth. But the most important element of pesak is intellectual honesty.
The search for retzon haBorei is not the place for playfulness and unbridled
creativity.  But Prof. Ross denies all this because, as noted above, to her mind there
is no absolute divine will.
Most regrettably, this volume is deeply marred throughout by a plethora of
errors in fact and analysis, a small selection of which now follows.67
(1) On page 15, Ross writes: “A few rabbinic sources appear to assume that all
the commandments were at the outset addressed only to men.” To justify this
statement, she refers (in note 40) to Tosefta Berakhot 6:23 [not 6:22 as written].
The latter cites Rabbi Judah as requiring a male to recite the benediction “...who
has not made me a woman, because they [women] are not obligated in mitzvot.”
This could readily mean that women are not obligated in some mitzvot, but Ross
understands this to indicate that they are not obligated in any mitzvot. Sadly, Ross’s
reading is totally untenable in light of the explicit and undisputed Mishnah in
Kiddushin, which states that women are obligated in all commandments, except
those positive commandments that are time determined.68 Instead of quoting this
authoritative Mishnah, she cites instead two medieval scholars, R. Menahem haMeiri
(Bet haBehira, Berakhot 60b) and R. Eliezer ben Yoel haLevi (Ra’avya) “who
understand the Tosefta as saying ... some mitzvot.” Studying these sources in their
entirety makes it clear that this is actually the Meiri’s reading in the Tosefta and
that of the Ra’avya in the Jerusalem Talmud.
Nevertheless, to corroborate her unprecedented “any mitzvot” suggestion, she
cites R. Solomon Adret (Rashba) to Kiddushin 34a, who indicates that “all the
Torah was written in the male gender.” Unfortunately, she errs twofold. Firstly,
67 Several other more minor errors: (1) Regarding p. 16, first line, “she-af hen hayu be-oto ha-
nes” is translated as “they too were witness to the same miracle.” This translation also
appears in note 43, p. 255; and note 18 on p. 280. This is incorrect and should be “for they,
too, were involved in the same miracle”; see end of note 42, supra. (2) On page 25,
penultimate line, Ross refers to R. Nahman’s request to “hand [his wife] Yalta the customary
cup of wine before the grace after meals” (Berakhot 51b). Actually, the purpose of passing
the cup was for her to drink from this “cup of blessing” (Shulkhan Arukh 183:4). However,
this cup is only passed around and drunk after birkat ha-mazon; see Pesahim 103b and
Shulkhan Arukh 190:1. (3) On p. 26, 6 lines from bottom, Prof. Ross states that women in
the Reform movement were granted equal rights and obligations in synagogue ritual dating
from 1820. Actually, a quick web search revealed that women were allowed to be counted
in a minyan only in 1845, to sit together with men in the synagogue in 1929, to receive
aliyot in the 1940s, to serve as cantors in 1955, and to be ordained as rabbis in 1972. (4)
Note 87, appearing at the end of the penultimate paragraph on p. 45, is missing from the
endnotes on p. 266.
68 See note 34, supra.86
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there is no commentary by the Rashba to Kiddushin 34a. Secondly, the statement
“all the Torah was written in the male gender” actually has a meaning opposite to
the way Ross understands it. In point of fact, it explains why women are generally
to be included in all Torah obligations, unless explicitly excluded by the use of the
superfluous word “man.”69
(2) On the same page, she writes that the mitzvah is to don “phylacteries (tefillin)
in the course of the morning prayer.” Actually, the mitzvah is to wear tefillin all day
long, and the obligation has no formal connection to the morning prayers. However,
because the wearing of tefillin requires special sanctity and intention, the medieval
custom became to limit tefillin wearing to the morning prayers.70
(3) On page 16 (and again on page 29), she discusses women in community
leadership roles and cites the prohibitive view of Maimonides, who bars women
from all such positions. She neglects to mention that the majority of medieval
scholars were lenient. Nor does she seem to be aware that, according to most modern
authorities, democratic appointments circumvent even Maimonides’ objections.71
Furthermore, the rationale she cites for Maimonides’ stringency, the honor of the
community (kevod ha-tzibbur), appears nowhere in the sources. Indeed, kevod ha-
tzibbur is only a rabbinic construct, while the prohibition against women in
communal leadership roles (serara) is, according to Maimonides, biblical in nature.
(4) On page 17, she links the absence of female leadership in the ultra-Orthodox
community with the objection in some isolated Hasidic circles to women driving a
car. There is no necessarily compelling connection, as a reading of the original
responsa literature will verify.72  The former is a communal matter, while the latter
is private in nature.
(5) In discussing the Jewish family on the same page, Prof. Ross contends that
the Halakhah is designed to subordinate women. As a result, therefore, she is
astounded that Halakhah frees women from the obligation to wed, procreate or
care for children. Should one, however, abandon Prof. Ross’s a priori premise and
adopt a view such as the thoughtful and sensitive perspective presented by R. Saul
Berman,73 then these halakhot are very much in keeping and congruous with the
69 Tosafot, Yoma 43a, s.v. “ve-Natan”; Tosafot, Nazir 29a, s.v. “leZakhar u-liNekeiva”; Tosafot,
Erakhim 2b, s.v. “leRabbot haIsha.”
70 Shulkhan Arukh, O.H., sec. 37, no. 2.
71 For further discussion, see Aryeh A. Frimer, “Nashim beTafkidim Tzibburiyim biTekufa
haModernit,” in “Afikei Yehudah – Rabbi Yehuda Gershuni zt”l Memorial Volume,” ed.
R. Itamar Warhaftig (Jerusalem: Ariel Press, 5765/2005), pp. 330-54. HTML file available
online at: http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/mishpach/maamad/nashim-2.htm.
72 R. Shmuel HaLevi Wosner, Resp. Shevet haLevi, IV, sec. 1, no. 2.
73 See note 33, supra.87
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overall role of women in halakhic Judaism. Briefly, according to R. Berman, males
have divinely mandated roles of Kohen, Levi and Yisrael, as well as husband and
father – roles clearly defined by a series of obligations and prohibitions. In
contradistinction, a woman’s role of wife, mother and homemaker is only a
preferred one, which the Torah hopes that women will voluntarily assume. To
assist women in implementing this role, the latter was protected by giving women
greater flexibility and freeing them from time-bound positive commandments and
those obligations that demand communal appearance.
(6) In the text on page 20, Prof. Ross cites Plaskow and Adler, who charge that
women are nowhere mentioned at the giving of the Torah, only to refer in note 92
to a few of the hundreds of midrashim who naturally and readily understand the
Toraidic text to be inclusive. The rabbinic interpretations are of course dubbed
apologetics. Even if that were so, these midrashim clearly demonstrate Hazal’s
almost instinctive predisposition to view women as integral to God’s revelation to
Klal Yisrael.
(7) On the next page she charges: “Standard prayers are also phrased with
reference to men only. The female pronoun appears only in brackets....” This is
another groundless, broad-sweeping charge, since nearly all the standard prayers
are gender neutral. The only possible exceptions are the birkhot ha-shahar, and in
this case the poskim extensively discuss the formulation that should be used. Thus,
upon waking and in the prayer “Elokai, neshama...,” women should say “...modah
ani le-fanecha” – not the masculine-gendered “modeh.”74 Indeed, this is the text
found not only in the popular Israeli Siddur Rinat Yisrael, but also the Roedelheim
Siddur Sfat Emet – which was probably the most widely used Siddur in the Orthodox
communities of pre-war Germany. Similarly, many authorities75 are of the opinion
74 R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Halikhot Shlomo, Hilkhot Tefilla, sec. 2, Devar Halakha, no.
5; R. Efraim Greenblatt, Resp. Rivevot Efrayyim, I, sec. 37, no. 2; Siddur Rinat Yisrael, ed.
R. Solomon Tal (Jerusalem: Moreshet, 5743); ha-Siddur le-Bat Yisrael (Jerusalem: Yeshivat
Ohr ve-Derekh, 5748); Siddur Tefillat Hana, ed. R. Isaac Bar-Da (Ramat Gan: 5746); Siddur
Hazon Ovadiah ha-Shalem (Jerusalem: Yeshivat Hazon Ovadiah, 5748); R. Isaac Yosef,
Dinei Hinukh Katan uBar Mitzva, Kuntres Dinei Hinukh Katan, sec. 1.
75 R. Hayyim Joseph David Azulai, Kesher Godel, sec. 5, no. 22; R. Joseph Hayyim, Od Yosef
Hai, Va-Yeshev, sec. 9; R. Jacob Hayyim Sofer, Kaf ha-Hayyim, O.H., sec. 46, no. 42 in the
name of the Pri Hadash; R. Judah Samuel Ashkenazi, Siddur Beit Oved; R. Jacob Zevi
Meklenburg, Siddur Avodat Yisrael; R. Mordechai Eliyahu, Sefer Halakha, I, Birkhot ha-
Shahar, no. 31, p. 37; references cited in note 74, supra; R. Hayyim David haLevi, Mekor
Hayyim le-Benot Yisrael, sec. 2, no. 2; R. Isaac Yosef, Otzar Dinim le-Isha u-le-Vat, sec. 2,
no. 1; R. Aaron Zakai, Mitzvot haNashim, sec. 1, no. 12; R. David Yosef, Halakha Berura,
III, sec. 46, no. 4, subsec. 10. See also R. Solomon Tal, ha-Siddur be-Hishtalsheluto, p. 39.88
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that women should say “she-lo asani goya” and “she-lo asani shifha”; these
formulations are specifically feminine forms and, hence, are to be preferred over
“goy” and “aved” which are the masculine forms. Many other authorities76 indicate
that, since “goy” and “aved” are also the generic formulation appropriate to both
genders, they should be preferred. The benediction “she-asani kirtzono,” which is
specifically for women,77 is found in all siddurim, as is the mi-she-beirakh for a
birthing mother, a female child, and an ill woman. The Yizkor memorial prayer
also has male and female formulations. If any insensitivity exists in the page layout
or instructions, it is on the part of the publishers, not the Halakhah.
(8) An article by this reviewer on women and minyan78 is cited on page 29, to
the effect that “only men are regarded as part of the ritual community (the edah)
quorum (minyan).” Again she errs: edah is not the criterion – obligation is. (The
use of edah in the Talmud is merely a mnemonic device; see the next comment.)
Because women are not obligated in public prayer, they do not count toward the
quorum of public prayer rituals. But where women are obligated equally, they are
included. Thus, according to the majority of poskim, women count toward the
minyan for the following rituals: 1) Megilla reading and the “haRav et riveinu”
benediction that follows it; 2) public martyrdom; 3) the haGomel blessing; 4)
circumcision; 5) kindling the Hanuka candles in the synagogue. Prof. Ross errs
again when she states (in note 93 to Chapter 5) that a minority opinion maintains
76 R. Abraham Butchach, Eshel Avraham, O.H., sec. 46, no. 14; R. Elijah Schlessinger, Resp.
Mahazeh Eliyahu, sec. 13; R. Jonah Metzger, Sefer me-Yam ha-Halakha, III, sec. 19;
R. David Auerbach, Halikhot Beita, sec. 3, no. 7; R. Isaac Jacob Fuchs, Halikhot Bat Yisrael,
sec. 2, no. 5; R. Jacob Kaminetsky, Emet le-Yaakov, O.H., sec. 46, note 50.
77 In passing, I would like to comment on the benediction “shelo asani isha” recited by men.
R. Reuven Margaliyot, Nitzotzei Or, Menahot 43b, translates this benediction not “...because
Thou has not created me a women,” but “...Who has not created me a women.”  This is not
an expression of celebratory thanks, argues R. Margaliyot, but of a serious and willing
acceptance of a weighty and spiritually dangerous role. There is a serious trade-off here.
After all, God could have chosen to create Jewish males as non-Jews or as women with a
concomitantly smaller burden of specific mitzvot. But the Jewish male’s greater role has its
dangers. Jewish men who do not respond to their greater calling – who, for example, do not
sit in a sukkah, neglect to don tallit or tefillin, or are careless about hearing shofar – are
punished for bittul aseh, for not fulfilling their positive obligations. Hence, by reciting she-
lo asani goy and she-lo asani isha, men acquiesce to the greater responsibility and risks that
have been thrust upon them. For an alternate approach, see R. Gidon G. Rothstein, “Men
and Women’s Differing Religious Aims, as Taught by the Category of Mitzvot Aseh she-
haZeman Grama,” available online at: http://www.utoronto.ca/wjudaism/contemporary/
articles/rothstein.html.
78 Aryeh A. Frimer, “Women and Minyan,” Tradition, 23:4, pp. 54-77 (Summer 1988). PDF
file available online at: http://www.jofa.org/pdf/Batch%201/0019.pdf.89
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that women may even join with men in constituting a minyan for Megilla reading.
This is actually the majority view.79
(9) She returns to a discussion of minyan on p. 88, and cites this reviewer80
regarding the following seeming paradox. The necessity for a minyan to sanctify
God’s name either through public martyrdom (kiddush haShem) or via certain public
prayers or rituals (devarim she-bi-kedusha) is derived from the same verse: “I
shall be sanctified (ve-nikdashti) in the midst of the children of Israel.”81
Nonetheless, while many authorities include women in the quorum for public
martyrdom, they are ineligible with regard to public prayer. Ross views this as a
classic example of an “inconsistent application of exclusionary textual readings.”
However, she overlooks the simple resolution already proposed in the article for
this seeming contradiction. The requirement of ten for public kiddush haShem is a
biblical obligation, and the reliance on the verse “ve-nikdashti” is a bona fide
derivation (derasha). However, according to most commentators,82 the reference
to this same verse for necessitating a minyan quorum for the davar she-bi-kedusha
public prayers and rituals is not a true derasha but rather an “asmakhta” (mnemonic
device for rabbinic obligations).83 As noted by Rabbenu Nissim Gerondi,84 this
logically follows from the fact that blessings and prayers are themselves only of
rabbinic origin. As a result, the rules for these two cases (martyrdom and public
prayers) may differ; ultimately, the controlling criterion is obligation. Thus, in the
case of martyrdom where women are obligated, they count for the quorum of public
kiddush haShem. By contrast, women are exempted from the obligation of public
prayers and rituals, and, hence, may not count towards the minyan required.
(10) On pages 19, 53 and 90, our author deals with the issue of women wearing
tzitzit and tefillin. She concludes that sincerely motivated women wearing tzitzit
and tefillin “is not antithetical to halakhic values.” The problem with tzitzit is one
of yohara, showing off – a faulty character trait. This is because tzitzit is only
obligatory for men if they wear a four-cornered garment, which is generally
uncustomary in our days.85  For a woman to wear tzitzit involves her assuming
79 Ibid., sec. F, pp. 64-66.
80 Aryeh A. Frimer, note 78, supra.
81 Leviticus 22:32
82 For an extensive list, see Aryeh A. Frimer, “Ma’amad haIsha beHalakha—Nashim uMinyan,”
Or haMizrah, 34:1,2 (Tishrei 5746), pp. 69-86, notes 14 and 15 therein. The first to take
this position is the R. Nissim Gerondi (Ran), Megilla 23b, s.v. “ve-Ein Nosim.”
83 For a discussion of asmakhtot see R. Menachem Elon, haMishpat haIvri (Jerusalem: Hebrew
University, Magnes Press, 1973), II, p. 256; Encyclopedia Talmudit, II, asmakhta.
84 See R. Nissim Gerondi, note 82, supra.
85 Mishne Torah, Hilkhot Tzitzit, 3:11. For a recent discussion, see R. Aharon Lichtenstein,90
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upon herself a double stringency: the first is to put on a non-normative four-cornered
garment; the second is to put tzitzit on the corners of the four-cornered garment
even though she is exempt.86 Thus, women wearing tzitzit, certainly as a tallit in
public view, could well be viewed as “showing off.” Nevertheless, R. Moses
Feinstein87 has ruled that if a woman wears tzitzit out of a righteous desire to perform
a mitzvah, then we should not be concerned with possible yohara.
But, as R. Feinstein himself indicates, donning tefillin is a totally different story.
Because of the sanctity of tefillin, Halakhah obligates one who wears them to be
careful about guf naki – a special requirement of physical cleanliness – which
prohibits, inter alia, flatulence, sleep, distracting thoughts, light-headedness, levity,
lying and lashon ha-ra.88 Furthermore, Jewish law objects to women’s donning
tefillin for fear that they will not be as careful about guf naki as required.89 Most
poskim argue that the fundamental distinction between men and women as regards
tefillin is not based on biology, but on halakhic obligation.90 According to this
“haIm Mitzvat Tzitzit Hi Hova”; available online at www.etzion.org.il/vbm.
86 Rema, O.H., sec. 17:2, Mishna Berura no. 5.
87 Resp. Iggerot Moshe, note 60, supra.
88 Shabbat 49a and 130a; Shulkhan Arukh, O.H., sec. 37, no. 2 and sec. 38, no. 14; Bi’ur
Halakha, sec. 37, s.v. “Mitsvatan”; Encyclopedia Talmudit, IX, “Hanahat Tefillin,” p. 466 –
see especially pp. 472 and 512; R. Menahem Mendel Kasher, Torah Sheleima, XII, Bo,
Addenda, no. 41, pp. 254-59 – reprinted in a somewhat expanded form in Resp. Divrei
Menahem, I, sec. 19; R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik as cited by R. Zvi (Hershel) Schachter,
“miPeninei Rabbeinu, Z”l,” Beit Yitzhak, 27, p. 1 (5755) – reprinted in R. Zvi (Hershel)
Schachter, miPeninei haRav (Jerusalem: Beit Midrash deFlatbush, 5761), p. 22; Resp. Shevet
haLevi, IX, O.H., sec. 18. Lying and lashon ha-ra are extensions of Rabbi Moses Sofer, see
Hiddushei Hatam Sofer, Shabbat 49a, s.v. “Amar,” and 130b, s.v. “Tefillin”; Derashot Hatam
Sofer, III, p. 96b, to Shabbat 49a and the Sha’ar Yosef ad loc.; Resp. Tzitz Eliezer, XIII, 10,
s.v. “beShulei haTeshuva.”
89 This ruling of the Rema, O.H., sec. 38, no 3, has been accepted by both Ashkenazic and
Sephardic codifiers. See ad loc.: Birkei Yosef, subsec. 1, Mishna Berura, subsec. 13, Arukh
haShulkhan, subsec. 6, Kaf haHayyim, subsec. 9; R. Haim David Halevi, Mekor Hayyim
leBenot Yisrael, sec. 3, note 14. An in-depth discussion of guf naki in regard to women is
beyond the scope of this paper. For some recent discussion, see R. Eliezer Berkovits,
“Hithayvut Atzmit al Nashim beMitzvat Aseh she-haZeman Grama,” Sinai, 100, pp. 187-93
(5747) – see especially 192ff.; R. Eliezer Berkovits, Jewish Women in Time and Torah
(Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 1990), Chap. 4, pp. 72-74; Aliza Berger, “Wrapped
Attention: May Women Wear Tefillin,” in Jewish Legal Writings by Women (Jerusalem:
Urim Publications, 1998), pp. 75-118 – see, however, note 93, infra.
90 See on Shulkhan Arukh, O.H., sec. 37, no. 3: R. Abraham Abli, Magen Avraham, subsec. 3;
R. Joseph Te’omim, Pri Megadim, Eshel Avraham, subsec. 3 and Mishbetzot Zahav, subsec.
2; R. Elazar Santav, Ma’aseh Roke’ah, subsec. 3; R. Judah Loew of Prague, Hidushei Gur
Arye, Eruvin 96a, s.v. “mi-deLo”; R. Joseph Engel, Gilyonei haShas, Eruvin 96a, s.v.91
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latter view (and contrary to Ross’s explanation on p. 90), the concern regarding guf
naki is a general one affecting both males and females alike. Nevertheless, men are
obligated to don tefillin and, perforce, concerns regarding guf naki are set aside for
the brief period of the shaharit prayers, so they can fulfill their minimal obligation
– but not beyond that.91 Women, on the other hand, are not required to put on
tefillin at all; hence, should a woman nevertheless wish to don them, we are to
protest such an action (mohin be-yada),92 lest she unnecessarily violate their sanctity.
In contradistinction to other time-determined commandments, a woman cannot
assume this stringency, because there is a clear downside.  In this light, it would
seem that the feministic insistence on wearing tefillin despite the unanimity of
codifiers for the last five hundred years93 – is indeed a rejection of the halakhic
process and is most certainly antithetical to halakhic values.
(11) On p. 86, Prof. Ross seeks an explanation for the supportive attitude of the
rabbinate to women’s increased Torah study, in contradistinction to their generally
negative attitude to women’s prayer groups. The obvious differences escape her.
Increased Torah study for women, from the time of its inception in 1917 by Sarah
Schnirer, was done with the consent, blessing and guidance of the generation’s
leading scholars: R. Abraham Mordechai Alter, the Gerer Rebbi; R. Joseph Isaac
Schneerson, the Lubavitcher Rebbi; R. Issachar Dov Rokeach, the Belzer Rebbi;
R. Israel Meir haKohen Kagan, the Hafetz Hayyim; and R. Hayyim Ozer
Grodzinsky.94 Prayer groups, on the other hand, were initiated by and large without
“Mikhal”; R. David Ortinberg, Tehilla leDavid, O.H., sec. 38, no. 1; R. Mordechai Carmi,
Ma’amar Mordechai, subsec. 3; Arukh haShulkhan, sec. 6; R. Ben-Tsiyon Lichtman, Benei
Tziyyon, I, O.H., sec. 38, no. 3, subsec. 2; Iggerot Moshe, O.H., IV, sec. 49; R. Joseph B.
Soloveitchik, supra, note 88; R. Benjamin Jehiel Zilber, Beit Barukh to Hayyei Adam, kelal
14, no. 18, subsec. 135. The fundamental distinction between these two approaches would
be in the case of an eved kena’ani (non-Jewish slave); see R. Shalom Isaac Mizrahi, Resp.
Divrei Shalom, O.H., I, sec. 15.
91 Shulkhan Arukh, O.H., sec. 37, no. 2; Resp. Shevet haLevi, IX, O.H., sec. 18.
92 Gloss of Rema to Shulkhan Arukh, O.H., 38, no. 3.
93 Aliza Berger’s reliance (supra, note 89) on a singular and even unconvincing ruling by
R. Saul Berman against the scores of major poskim and key codifiers of the past five centuries
seems rather tendentious. See also the critique of R. Aharon Feldman in note 5, supra, and
“Communications: Jewish Legal Writings by Women,” Tradition, 34:1 (Fall 2000), pp.
107-11. That Prof. Ross finds this lone article sufficient grounds for undoing such a
longstanding ruling, demonstrates a lack of appreciation for the dynamic of the halakhic
process.
94 Shoshana Pantel Zolty, And All Your Children Shall Be Learned: Women and the Study of
Torah in Jewish Law and History (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1993), pp. 278-79. See
also R. Emanuel Feldman, “Communications: …Who has not made me a Woman,” Tradition,
32:2 (Winter 1998), pp. 171-73.92
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the approval or guidance of leading rabbinic authorities; in many cases, their
initiation was an act of rebellion.
Furthermore, as noted by R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, women’s Torah study is
an authentic halakhic category involving greater kiyyum ha-mitzvah (fulfillment
of a commandment); women’s prayer groups are not.95 Contrary to Tova Hartman
Halbertal’s assertion that “Our congregating has religious significance,”96 a women’s
tefilla group has no more halakhic significance than nine men praying together. Of
course, it has significance, as does the prayer of any single individual; but it is not
tefilla be-tzibbur (public prayer). A true desire for kiyyum ha-mitzvah would dictate
that women pray together with a bona fide minyan of ten men. No wonder, then,
that rabbinic authorities are less than enthusiastic about such prayer groups.
(12) Ross wonders on p. 92 why the poskim are so concerned that feminist
motivations be spiritually and sincerely motivated. Why not simply assume that
proper intention will come with time, as suggested by the talmudic principle “mi-
tokh she-lo li-shemah ba li-shemah.” The answer is straightforward: Jewish law
and the rabbinic establishment are justifiably wary of new innovations, especially
when they appear motivated by – and are accompanied by the rhetoric of – rebellion
against halakhic values. R. Feinstein’s comments in this regard have already been
cited above.97 Similarly, the renowned jurist and former Deputy President of the
Israeli Supreme Court, Justice Menachem Elon, in his noted “The Women of the
Wall” decision, underscores the significance of this motivational element:
A well-established principle in the world of Halakhah – when enacting
legislation, establishing custom, or introducing changes in them – is
that the observance of a ritual must be performed with the intent and
purpose of fulfilling the mitzvah and not out of a motivation to
disregard a halakhic rule (din) because of “extraneous considerations.”
[Such “extraneous considerations”] include the fundamental objection
to, and offense taken from, women’s essential exemption [from certain
commandments and rituals].... This requirement is counted among
the value-based precepts of the halakhic system, which serves as a
major factor in determining the judicial policy of the Halakhah in
95 See the relevant comments of R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik cited in Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov
I. Frimer, note 32, supra, text at note 242, note 244 and end of note 285 therein.
96 Tova Hartman Halbertal, “Rabbinic Backlash against Women’s Prayer Groups: The Uses
and Abuses of Meta-Halakha,” taped lecture at the Third International Conference on
Feminism and Orthodoxy (New York City, February 2000).
97 See the quote following note 60, supra.93
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general, and in sensitive and unique issues, such as the one before us,
in particular.98
It should be noted that the issue of motivation is of substantially less concern when
one is fulfilling an obligation. Hence, women’s Megilla readings have found much
more widespread acceptance among poskim.99 However, the general policy is
historically more guarded regarding non-obligatory innovations, in line with the
dictum of Hazal: “kol ha-mishaneh yado al ha-tahtona” (“One who innovates is at
a disadvantage, i.e., must prove his/her position”).100 The principle “mi-tokh she-lo
li-shmah ba li-shmah” relates to existing obligations. Moreover, Orthodox Judaism
has always held religious subjectivism suspect, especially when it comes at the
expense of a greater and proper kiyyum ha-mitzvah (fulfillment of a bona fide
obligation).101
(13) The preclusion of women from receiving aliyot because of kevod ha-tzibbur
(honor of the community) is discussed on page 97 and again on page 256, note 57
(to page 16). Ross writes that kevod ha-tzibbur should be understood to mean that
the community is disgraced by the implication that no competent male could be
found for the task of reading the Torah. She references R. Mendel Shapiro’s article
in the Edah Journal102 who, based on this understanding of kevod ha-tzibbur, argues
98 Justice R. Menahem Elon, “Hoffman et al. vs. the Custodian of the Western Wall; Alter et
al. vs. the Minister of Religious Affairs et al.” (1994), Bagatz 257/89, Piskei Din 48 (ii), pp.
265-358 – at p. 308. See also p. 323. The syntax of the original Hebrew is quite complex
and has been somewhat simplified in our English translation.
99 See Aryeh A. Frimer, “Women’s Megillah Reading,” in Traditions and Celebrations for the
Bat Mitzvah, ed. Ora Wiskind Elper (Jerusalem: Urim Publications, 2003), pp. 281-304.
Word file available online at: http://www.matan.org.il/Data/UploadedFiles/Free/
bm_Frimer_eng_101.doc.
100 Bava Metzia, 76a.
101 See R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, The Halakhic Mind (New York: Seth Press, distributed by
the Free Press – A Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1986), pp. 62-99; R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik,
Nora’ot haRav, X, ed. B. David Schreiber (New York, NY: B.D. Schreiber, 1999), pp. 88ff;
Samuel A. Safran, “R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik: Man of Halacha, Man of Faith,” B.D.D., 9
(Summer 1999), English section, pp. 99-115, notes 13 and 19; and the related comments of
Jonathan Rosenblum, “Sincerity is Not the Issue,” The Jerusalem Post, Friday, 7 July 2000,
p. 19. As the Rav himself stated in a 1955 lecture to the Yeshiva University Rabbinic Alumni,
cited by R. Aaron Rakeffet-Rothkoff, The Rav: The World of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik
(New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1999), II, pp. 174: “Every religious experience must
be based on halakha. The religious emotion must originate from the fusion of the intellect
and the halakha.” See also R. Aharon Lichtenstein, “Joseph Soloveitchik” in Great Jewish
Thinkers of the Twentieth Century, ed. Simon Noveck (Bnai Brith, 1963), pp. 281-97.
102. R. Mendel Shapiro, “Qeri’at ha-Torah by Women: A Halakhic Analysis,” The Edah Journal,
1:2 (Sivan 5761).94
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that, from a strictly halakhic standpoint, there is little reason to prohibit women’s
aliyot today. However, in actuality, it was R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin who introduced
this view into current halakhic discourse two decades ago.103 Hence, Ross’s account
on page 180 that “R. Henkin accepts Shapiro’s essential argument...” should actually
read “R. Shapiro accepts R. Henkin’s essential argument....” From R. Henkin’s
perspective, however, all this was theoretical; in practice, he maintains that regular
women’s aliyot remain unacceptable because they violate the communal custom
of millennia.104 More fundamentally, however, the analyses of both R. Shapiro and
R. Henkin are problematic, for a plethora of reasons that are beyond the scope of
this review.105 However, it should be noted that among these reasons is the fact that
the overwhelming majority of rabbinic commentators reject the abovementioned
understanding of kevod ha-tzibbur.106 Once again, Prof. Ross’s difficulties with
Halakhah emanate from her adopting clear minority views.
(14) In her discussion of halakhic directions of the future, Prof. Ross cites (p.
236) an unpublished ruling by R. Yoel Bin-Nun as a prime example.107 The latter
suggests that, despite the mishnaic exemption of women from time-determined
103 R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin, “Mahu Kevod haTzibbur,” HaDarom, 55 (Elul 5746), p. 33 (see
p. 39); R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin, Bnei Vanim, I, sec. 4; II, sec. 10; and IV, sec. 2.
104 R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin, “Qeri’at Ha-Torah by Women: Where We Stand Today.” The
Edah Journal, 1:2 (Sivan 5761). See also R. Mendel Shapiro and R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin,
“Concluding Responses to Qeri’at ha-Torah for Women,” ibid.
105 A series of refutations have recently appeared, are in press or in preparation; see R. Eliav
Shochetman, “Aliyat Nashim leTorah,” Sinai, Vols. 135-36 (2005), pp. 271-349; R. Gidon
G. Rothstein, “Qeri’at haTorah by Orthodox Women: What’s the Halakhic Story?,” Tradition,
39:2 (2006; in press); R. Michael J. Broyde, “Women Receiving Aliyot? A Short Halachic
Analysis” (in preparation); R. Ephraim Bezalel Halivni, “Women, Keriah and Aliyot to the
Torah” (in preparation); Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, “Women, Kri’at haTorah and
Aliyot” (in preparation).
106 Inter alia: R. Yaakov Emden, R. Abraham David Rabinowitz-Teomim, R. Dov Eliezerov,
R. Joseph Kapah, R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, R. Shaul Yisraeli, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach,
R. Zalman Nechemia Goldberg, R. Shlomo Yosef Elyashiv, R. Eliezer Waldenberg, R. Efraim
Greenblatt and R. Ovadiah Yosef. See Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, note 105, supra.
107 In a communication to Women’s Tefilla Network (WTN:7031), 11 June 2003, Prof. Ross
indicated that her presentation of R. Bin-Nun’s position is based on a direct interview she
had with him. He later confirmed the written rendition of his position as it now appears in
“Expanding the Palace of Torah.” Similar comments were made by R. Bin-Nun in a public
lecture, as reported by Debbie Weissman (WTN:7019) on 9 June 2003. The category of
benot horin is also introduced by R. Bin-Nun in his response to the article of Ayelet Regev,
“Birkat Hatanim: haIm Minyan Gevarim Hu Hekhrehi,” Geranot (Jerusalem: Women’s Bet
Midrash, Bet Morasha, 5763), pp. 153-78, beginning at p. 172. This response has been
reprinted in a recent collection of R. Bin-Nun’s halakhic writings, meHevyon Oz – Pirkei95
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positive commandments,108 modern women’s halakhic obligation to perform mitzvot
is, in principle, equal to that of men. Basing himself on R. David Abudraham,109
R. Bin-Nun concludes that the exemption of women from time-bound obligations
in the past was due simply to their dependent status, whereby their time was not
under their control. This is because contemporary women are benot horin
(independent women) and no longer regard themselves as subject to the authority
of their fathers or husbands. R. Bin-Nun relies further on the classical halakhic
authority of the 17th century, R. Abraham Gombiner, author of Magen Avraham,110
who declared that a woman may voluntarily take on the performance of a mitzvah
and, thereby, transform its status to that of a compulsory obligation. From this,
R. Bin-Nun concludes that if a group of modern women consistently undertake the
obligation of prayer, this allows them to form a proper minyan (prayer quorum) for
themselves and to recite all the blessings that generally require a male quorum
(devarim she-bi-kedusha). This ruling could obviously be extended to other time-
bound mitzvot.111
Unfortunately, R. Bin-Nun’s ruling rests on a very shaky, problematic and
questionable foundation, as we will shortly demonstrate. It is true that it would be
unfair to hold Prof. Ross accountable for the faults of R. Bin-Nun’s analysis.
Nevertheless, in light of the scrutiny to which Ross has subjected other halakhic
rulings, it is noteworthy and somewhat puzzling that this novel pro-feminist position
is presented in great detail, without the slightest word of criticism or critical analysis.
This raises the query whether the favorability of the result is the ultimate criterion
for a feminist acceptance of a halakhic ruling. Where does intellectual honesty and
integrity come into play? These are essential methodological questions which Prof.
Ross nowhere addresses in her volume, and their absence is sadly felt.
Halakha uMussar (Yeshivat Kibbutz haDati, Tamuz 5763), pp. 61-62. For a critique of
several elements of this responsum, in particular, and R. Bin Nun’s approach to halakhah,
in general, see R. Hayyim Navon, “Mi Yifsok leGingiyim,” Mekor Rishon, Shabbat, 27
October 2006 (5 Heshvan 5757), p. 17. See also Amit Gevaryahu, “Hadash Tahat haShemesh
– Halakha veOrtodoksia Yetziratit etzel haRav Yoel Bin-Nun,” Akdamot, 16 (Av 5765),
pp. 65-80, at pp. 74 and 79-80.
108 Supra, note 34.
109 R. David Abudraham, Sefer Abudraham, Sha’ar 3, Birkat haMitzvot.
110 R. Abraham Gombiner, Magen Avraham, O.H., 489, subsec. 1. The view of Magen Avraham
is a matter of considerable debate; see R. Ovadiah Yosef, Resp. Yehave Da’at, II, sec. 70;
R. Ovadiah Yosef, Resp. Yabia Omer, II, O.H., sec. 30.
111 The latter portion of the responsa bears a striking resemblance to a ruling by Conservative
rabbi Joel Roth, “On the Ordination of Women as Rabbis: Studies and Responsa,” in The
Ordination of Women as Rabbis, ed. Simon Greenberg (New York: The Jewish Theological
Seminary of America, 1988), pp. 127-87. See, however, the refutation by R. Gidon G.96
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Returning now to R. Bin-Nun’s responsum, it suffers from several glaring
shortcomings. Firstly, the Torah did not reveal to us the rationale for women’s
exemption from time-determined obligations. The Abudraham proposal is merely
one of many suggestions112 and, despite its popularity, has been seriously
challenged.113 How can one change biblical law, even permit berakhot le-vatala
(needless benedictions), based on mere conjecture regarding its rationale?
Secondly, R. Bin-Nun’s “new” category of benot horin has actually been around
for millennia in the form of adult single, divorced and widowed women, who –
despite their totally independent status – are still not obligated in time-determined
obligations.114 The suggestion that an adult bachelorette is under the halakhic control
of her father is simply untrue. The category of an “important woman” (isha hashuva)
invoked by R. Bin-Nun (in note 12 on page 304) as coming “closest to the liberated
status of many women today” has been around since talmudic times,115 and as a
widespread social phenomenon from the 13th century.116 Yet no posek has suggested
that such liberated women could obligate themselves in time-determined obligations.
Thirdly, if the women as benot horin are inherently obligated, why is there any
need to invoke the Magen Avraham to the effect that women can take on
obligations? This is presumably clarified by note 12 on page 304. Ross reports that
R. Bin-Nun initially assumed that women, who are no longer bound by the needs
of others, should be regarded as obligated to perform all the mitzvot. However,
confronted with the general reluctance of women to assume men’s roles, he altered
Rothstein, “The Roth Responsum on the Ordination of Women,” Tradition, 24:1, pp. 104-
15 (Fall 1988), and the exchange of letters between Joel Roth and Gidon Rothstein, “On the
Ordination of Women,” Tradition, 24:4 (Summer 1989), pp. 112-14.
112 See R. Getsel Ellinson, Serving the Creator: A Guide to the Rabbinic Sources (Jerusalem:
World Zionist Organization, 1986), Chap. 2, sec. IX,  pp. 39-42.
113 R. Isaac Judah Schmelkes, Resp. Bet Yitshak, II, Y.D., part 1, sec. 94, no. 10; R. Barukh
haLevi Epstein, Torah Temima, Exodus 13:9, note 42; R. Shalom Taubes (Toibisch), Resp.
She’eilat Shalom, II, sec. 46 and 47; R. David Leifer, Resp. Bet David, sec. 70; R. Shlomo
Schneider, Resp. Divrei Shlomo, II, sec. 127. See also the sources cited in note 114, infra.
R. Emanuel Rackman notes that women are obligated in all the mitzvot of Pesach, which is
certainly the busiest time of year in a Jewish home; see R. Emanuel Rackman, “Arrogance
or Humility in Prayer,” Tradition (Fall, 1958), pp. 13-26.
114 See R. Joseph Saul Nathanson, Resp. Sho’el uMeishiv, I, Part 1, sec. 61; R. Barukh Epstein
and R. Shlomo Schneider, supra, note 113; R. Gedaliah Felder, Yesodei Yeshurun, I,
Ma’arekhet Tzitzit, p. 65 and references cited therein; R. Abraham Weinfeld, Resp. Lev
Avraham, I, end of sec. 122; R. Zvi Zev Friedman, Tiferet Yosef, Genesis 2:18, pp. 86-87.
115 Pesahim 108a and elsewhere.
116 The statement of Rema, O.H., 472 to the effect that all our women are “nashim hashuvot” is
based on previous such statements of the 13th century: Mordechai (Pesahim 108a) and
Rabbenu Yeruham.97
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his position, concluding that modern women, who are not burdened with the yoke
of family responsibilities, should also be left free to choose which of the mitzvot
they will adopt. But, this transformation in R. Bin-Nun’s position is astounding. If
he honestly believes that independent women are inherently biblically obligated,
why should they be any different than men who are obligated – whether they like
it or not?
Fourthly, if obligation devolves on the women because of repeated performance
of a mitzvah, then the benot horin analysis is totally irrelevant. What’s worse, as
several scholars have already commented, the acceptance route solves nothing.117
It is true that women who repeatedly take upon themselves the performance of a
normally voluntary mitzvah may transform its status into that of a compulsory
obligation. But this is not because there is now an inherent obligation, but rather
because there is now a neder mitzvah – an oath to perform a righteous act.118 As
such, the obligation can be removed via hatarat neder (procedure for removal of
an oath).119  In addition to not being inherent, an assumed obligation may only
have a lesser rabbinic stature, even if the original commandment may have been
biblical in authority.120
The fact that women’s performance remains inherently optional, or even
obligatory but of lesser stature, has direct halakhic repercussions with regard to
women’s ability to assist men in fulfilling their inherent obligations. This is because,
as a rule, one Jew can assist another in fulfilling his/her obligations only if the
former has an obligation that is equal to or greater than that of the latter.121 A classic
example is the centuries-old custom of religious women to hear shofar blowing;
the various codes of Jewish law indicate that this custom obligates women to
continue this practice yearly.122 However, since they are not inherently obligated,
they cannot blow shofar for men.123 The lack of inherent obligation in tefilla be-
117 See R. Solomon Kluger, Resp. uVaharta vaHayyim, sec. 51; R. Samuel E. Volk, Sha’arei
Tohar, VI, sec. 47, end of no. 2; Gidon Rothstein, note 111, supra;
118 Halikhot Beita, Petah haBayit no. 22, and sec. 20, note 4.
119 Shulkhan Arukh, Y.D., sec. 214, no. 1; R. Ovadiah Yosef, supra, note 110.
120 R. Solomon Kluger, note 117, supra; R. Ovadiah Yosef, Resp. Yabia Omer, supra, note 110.
121  “Kol she-eino mehuyav ba-davar, eino motzi et ha-rabim yedei hovatam – Anyone who is
not obligated, cannot assist others in fulfilling their obligation.” Mishna, Rosh haShana
3:8.
122 Halikhot Beita, sec. 20, no. 3, para. 4; R. Ovadiah Yosef, supra, note 110.
123 Halikhot Beita, sec. 20, no. 3, para. 7. See also Israel M. Ta-Shma, note 36, supra, p. 267
therein, regarding tzitzit and lulav. Prof. Ta-Shma demonstrates that although Rabbenu Tam
clearly encouraged women to perform time-bound mitzvot and even recite the appropriate
berakha, he nonetheless clearly distinguished between inherent option and obligation. Thus
Rabbenu Tam did not allow women to prepare tzitzit on a tallit for men.98
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tzibbur (public prayer) and keri’at haTorah (Torah reading) is also the fundamental
reason why women cannot serve as hazzaniyot or ba’alot keri’a.124 Most importantly,
the quorum required for a minyan is ten individuals who are inherently obligated.125
Interestingly, even in the case of Megilla reading, where both genders indeed have
a bona fide obligation, Ashkenazic sources rule that a Megilla reading performed
by women does not exempt Ashkenazic men from their obligation. This is because
a woman’s duty is not on the same maximal level as that of men.126 Thus, we see
that invoking the Magen Avraham solves no problem for feminists.
(15) On page 239, Tamar Ross turns to the laws of ritual purity. She indicates
that, biblically, a menstruant (nidda) may resume sexual relations after immersing
in a mikveh the evening after the cessation of her menstrual flow. This is inaccurate,
since biblically a nidda must abstain from sexual relations for a minimum of seven
days (Leviticus 15:19). She then notes that the rabbis gave every nidda the more
stringent status of a zava, a woman who had a flow out of cycle, which requires
seven “clean” days in addition to the days of menstrual flow. Prof. Ross is again
imprecise, since the practice that all menstrual flow has the status of a zava requiring
seven “clean” days is actually the stringency of the daughters of Israel (humrat
benot yisrael).127
She then inserts the following statement: “This imposition [of the zava status]
is despite the fact that…both men and women are regarded as ritually defiled to
the highest degree (temei’ei met)....” This latter comment is totally irrelevant to the
present discussion of the sexual interaction of a woman and her spouse. The laws
of nidda have two distinct aspects to them.128 One affects a woman’s ability to
engage in sexual relations and remains operative to this day. The second has to do
with ritual impurity as regards the laws of the Temple. The latter aspect, like the
rules of tumat met, has been generally out of use129 for two millennia.
The bottom line is that a couple must abstain from physical contact for a few
days longer than actually biblically ordained. Citing a responsum of R. Ovadiah
124 Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, note 105, supra.
125 See note 78, supra.
126 See Aryeh A. Frimer, note 99, supra.
127 Berakhot 31a; Megilla 28b, Nidda 66a. For a clear presentation of the development of the
laws of nidda, see R. Abraham Danzig, Hokhmat Adam, Hilkhot Nidda, sec. 107, especially
para. 1, 5, 15-19.
128 R. Judah haLevi, Kuzari, 3:49; R. Aryeh Leib haKohen, Shev Shmateta, Shmateta 1, sec. 12;
R. Joseph Engel, Atvan deOraita, sec. 21.  For a varying formulation, see R. Joab Joshua
Kinski, Resp. Helkat Yoav, Mahadura Kamma, Y.D., sec. 29.
129 Certain limited aspects remain relevant to kohanim (see Leviticus 21:1 and Shulkhan Arukh,
Y.D., 373) and to all Jews regarding entry to the Temple mount.99
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Yosef,130 she then states that there is a precedent for leniency, “taking into account
men’s sexual needs.” Reading the teshuva itself makes it clear that the leniencies
have to do with mitzvat ona, which is a husband’s obligation to satisfy his wife’s
sexual needs; this is all the more true the night before the husband leaves on a trip,
which is the instance to which R. Yosef is referring.131 Ross next suggests that the
rabbis were insensitive to “women’s psychological needs for physical expressions
of affection that do not entail full sexual relations.” Here too she seems unaware
that many, if not most, authorities rule, like Maimonides, that the prohibition against
physical expressions of affection before a menstruant immerses in a mikveh is
actually biblical in nature.132
To conclude this section, we note that one of the preeminent Orthodox Jewish
thinkers and talmudists of the 20th century, Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, has
summarized for us the prerequisite qualifications necessary for one who wants to
become involved in public halakhic discourse.133
First, one has to be a lamdan [scholar]. Just as one who speaks about
mathematics or physics must have a thorough knowledge of his field,
so must one first know the Halakhah in order to discuss its problems.
But lamdanut [scholarship] cannot be achieved without study, nor
by the process of Divine Revelation. One must sacrifice years of
study to Halakhah in order to understand it.
Secondly, one must unconditionally accept the sacredness of the
Halakhah in its eternal and absolute character. One must confess that
it obligates everyone to realize its demands at all times and under all
130 Resp. Yabia Omer, I, Y.D., sec. 15.
131 See inter alia: Pesahim 72b, “Rava said: a man is obligated to rejoice his wife with a
meritorious act” and Rashi ad loc.; Shulkhan Arukh, E.H., sec. 76; Resp. Iggerot Moshe,
E.H., I, sec. 102, s.v. “u-biDvar”; ibid., E.H., III, sec. 28; ibid., E.H., IV, sec. 86.
132 Leviticus 18:19 “And to a menstruant in her ritual impurity do not come close to uncover
her nakedness.” Safra ad loc. writes: “I only know that it is forbidden to uncover, how do I
know it is forbidden to come close? For it is written: do not come close…”; Maimonides,
Sefer haMitzvot, Lavim 353; Mishne Torah, Hil. Issurei Biah, 21:1; Hinukh, Commandment
188; R. Shabbetai ben Meir ha-Kohen, Siftei Kohen (Shakh), Y.D., 157:1, no. 7. Nahmanides
dissents, however. For reviews, see Encyclopedia Talmudit, VI, Gilui Arayot, pp. 106-15, at
p. 111; Otzar haPoskim, IX, E.H., sec. 20, para. 1, no. 5, pp. 27-28.
133 R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, “On Orthodoxy and Non-Orthodox Movements,” in Community,
Covenant and Commitment: Selected Letters and Communications, ed. Nathaniel Helfgot
(New Jersey: The Toras HoRav Foundation/Ktav, 2005), Chap. 21, pp. 143-49, at p. 147.
See also R.J. David Bleich, “Lomdut and Psak: Theoretical Analysis and Halakhic Decision-
Making,” in R.J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, V (Soutfield, MI: Targum
Press, Inc., 2005), pp. xi-xxxvi.100
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conditions – social, political or cultural. One cannot be selective about
Halakhah and say: “This part pleases me and the other does not;
lighting candles I will accept, but not the laws of purity of the family.”
Either one believes in Torah min ha-shamayim [the Divine origin of
the Torah], and one accepts the Halakhah in its totality, or one does
not believe in this basic principle and rejects it entirely. Halakhah, to
be accepted in part, is impossible.
Thirdly, the interpretation of Halakhah must be accomplished in
accordance with the methods, principles and categorical forms of the
halakhic logic, which were hammered out by the sages of Torah,
rishonim [early rabbinic period] and aharonim [late rabbinic period],
Rashi, the Tosafists, Ramban, the Shakh, Rav Akiva Eiger, Rav
Hayyim Brisker, etc. The substance of Halakhah is tradition. Not
only the content and the text, but also the formal instruments of
halakhic thinking that have been handed down from generation to
generation.
V. Points to Ponder
Despite the above criticism, Tamar Ross’s volume does raise a variety of issues
that should concern the Orthodox community.134
(a) Opportunities for Unmediated Communal Rituals: Many halakhically
committed women seek wider opportunities for unmediated communal rituals. For
example, while both men and women are enjoined by Jewish law to pray daily,
women need not fulfill their obligation within the context of communal services.
Since it is the men who are obligated in public prayer and Torah reading, it is the
men who count for the required minyan and lead the community in these rituals.135
Thus, from the perspective of Orthodox women, public prayer rituals as a rule
involve the intermediacy of men. While this may be the halakhic reality, there are
many women who nevertheless seek a more active and meaningful involvement in
the spiritual moments of public prayer. One response has been women’s tefilla
(prayer) groups which, according to Gitelle Rapoport: give many women nahat
134 Many of the issues below have been discussed previously by Joel B. Wolowelsky; see Joel
B. Wolowelsky, Women, Jewish Law and Modernity: New Opportunities in a Post-Feminist
Age (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House,  1997); Joel B. Wolowelsky “Feminism and
Judaism: Women, Tradition, and the Women’s Movement, by Michael Kaufman – Review,”
Judaism, 47 (Fall 1998), p. 499; Joel B. Wolowelsky, “Embers to Radical Flames,”
Hamevaser, Tevet 5759 [January 1999].
135 Aryeh A. Frimer, supra, note 78.101
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ru’ah (spiritual satisfaction);136 ease the pain some women feel at permanent
exclusion from minyan; intensify concentration and kavanna; provide an opportunity
to sing praise to God, out loud, without fear of objections related to kol isha;
encourage more serious study of the tefillot, Torah portions and haftarot; enhance
diversity of practice, within halakhic parameters, of the Jewish community; and
consequently strengthen the perception that Orthodox Judaism is sensitive to
individual spiritual needs.137 As indicated earlier, the rabbinate has been seriously
split on the advisability of such prayer groups for a variety of hashkafic and public
policy grounds.138 But if the verdict is indeed in the negative on this innovation,
some appropriate meaningful alternatives must be seriously considered.
(b) Life Cycle Events: Somewhat related to the issue of women’s tefilla groups,
is the issue of how the Orthodox community celebrates life-cycle events. In the
case of a male child there are a variety of events, such as shalom zakhar, brit mila,
pidyon ha-ben, bar-mitzvah (including keri’at haTorah, aliya, haftara, devar Torah
and even serving as hazzan), aufruf and/or Shabbat hatan. For daughters, the
opportunities and the spiritual quality of the celebrations are much more limited.
Women’s prayer groups often serve as the venue for such communal celebrations.
Indeed, women, who are only marginally involved in tefilla groups on a regular
basis, eagerly attend when some special occasion or event is celebrated – be it a
simhat bat (or zeved ha-bat), bat mitzvah, engagements, a Shabbat kala, or a
women’s Megilla reading. However, if, as noted above, the verdict is indeed in the
negative on tefilla groups, the rabbinate should actively seek out meaningful ways
and appropriate frameworks to celebrate these formative and transitional moments.
(c) Megilla Reading, haGomel Benediction, Zimmun and Mourner’s
Kaddish: There are several rituals, benedictions and prayers that women are
empowered to recite in public. For example, inasmuch as women are halakhically
obligated in hearing the Megilla, the notion of a women’s Megilla reading poses
less of a problem for rabbinic authorities than does the idea of a women’s prayer
group. As a result, many poskim139 – including some who oppose women’s prayer
groups140 – concur that there is little if any halakhic problem with women reading
136 Sifra, Parsheta 2; Hagiga 16b.
137 Gitelle Rapoport, Letter to the Editor, Tradition, 33:2 (Winter 1999), p. 82.
138 See the discussion in Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, supra, note 32.
139 See the discussion in Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, supra, note 32 and Aryeh A.
Frimer, supra, note 99.
140 In the words of R. David Feinstein: “You can’t forbid women from doing that in which
they’re obligated.” See the discussion in Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, supra, note 32,
note 221 therein.102
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Megilla for themselves, individually or in a large group. Similarly, despite the
widespread impression to the contrary, women, too, are obligated by the majority
of poskim to recite the haGomel blessing in the presence of a minyan.141 They may
rise in the women’s section and say it as the whole congregation responds.142  In
addition, Shulkhan Arukh143 rules clearly that three or more women are empowered
to make their own zimmun prior to birkat ha-mazon. Indeed, R. Shlomo Zalman
Auerbach144 indicates that three women, who ate with fewer than three men, may
make a zimmun even in the presence of the men, and the latter may join in the
response “barukh she-akhalnu....” Finally, there is also substantial rabbinic
precedent for women to recite kaddish for a deceased relative.145
141 R. Hayyim Joseph David Azulai, Birkei Yosef, O.H., 219:2; R. Elijah Shapiro, Elya Rabba,
O.H., 219:12; R. Schneur Zalman of Lyady, Seder Birkat haNehenin  13:3; R. Yaacov Emden,
Siddur Shaarei Shamayim, Birkat haGomel, 2; R. Ephraim Margaliyot, Shaarei Efrayyim 4,
Pithei Shaarim 28; R. Joseph Hayyim, Ben Ish Hai, Ekev, 5; R. Abraham Danzig, Hayyei
Adam  65:2; R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Resp. Tziz Eliezer 13, 17; R. Barukh Goldberg, Penei
Barukh, Bikur Holim keHilkhato 2:33 – see also comments of R. Y.Y. Fisher therein, who
notes that the custom nowadays is that women do make the haGomel blessing; R. Abraham
Alkalai, Zechor le-Avraham II, O.H., II, sec. 12; R. Judah Samuel Ashkenazi, Siddur Beit
Oveid, Birkat haGomel laws 22; R. Jacob Culi, me-Am Lo’ez, Vayera, p. 348; Derech  Yeshara
2, 12.
142 R. Hayyim ben Israel Benveniste, Knesset haGedola, O.H., 219:9 – cited by Birkei Yosef,
O.H., 219:2; R. Shneur Zalman of Lyady, Seder Birkat haNehenin  13:3; R. Judah Ashkenazi,
Be’er Hetev, ibid., no. 1; Mishna Berura, ibid., no. 3; Kaf HaHayyim, ibid., no. 3; R. Ovadiah
Yosef, Yehave Da’at IV:15, note 1; R. Ovadiah Yosef, Resp. Yabia Omer, VIII:22, no. 10;
R. Barukh Pinhas Goldberg, Penei Barukh, Bikur Holim keHilkhato 2:33, note 80.
143 Shulkhan Arukh, O.H., 199, no. 6; Encyclopedia Talmudit, XII, “Zimmun,” sec. 8. See also
R. Ari Z. Zivotofsky and Naomi T.S. Zivotofsky, “What’s Right with Women and Zimmun,”
Judaism, 42:4 (168) (Fall, 1993), pp. 453-64; R. Ari Z. Zivotofsky, “Legal-ease: What’s the
Truth about ... Womens Zimmun?,” Jewish Action, 60:1 (Fall 5760/1999), p. 52; Joel
B. Wolowelsky, supra, note 134, pp. 34-42; Joel B. Wolowelsky, “Women and Zimmun,” in
Traditions and Celebrations for the Bat Mitzvah, ed. Ora Wiskind Elper (Jerusalem: Urim
Publications, 2003), pp. 257-68.
144 R. David Auerbach, Halikhot Beita 12:7, n. 14. R. Aharon Lichtenstein, in an oral
communication to R. Dov I. Frimer, concurs.
145 For recent reviews, see Joel B. Wolowelsky, “Women and Kaddish,” Judaism, 44:3 (Summer
1995), pp. 282-90; Joel B. Wolowelsky, Women, Jewish Law and Modernity: New
Opportunities in a Post-Feminist Age (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House,  1997), pp.
84-94; R. Reuven Fink, “The Recital of Kaddish by Women,” The Journal of Halacha and
Contemporary Society, 31 (Spring 1996), pp. 23-37; R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin, Letter to the
Editor, The Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, 32 (Fall 1996), pp. 97-102;
reprinted in Equality Lost: Essays in Torah, Halacha and Jewish Thought (Jerusalem: Urim
Publications, 1999), pp. 42-53; R. Yisroel Taplin, Ta’arikh Yisrael, sec. 19, no. 19, note 34;
R. Eliav Shochetman, “Aliyot Nashim la-Torah,” Kovetz haRambam (Jerusalem: Mossad103
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Despite the substantial halakhic support for each of these practices, there is
still hesitancy in the Orthodox community to adopt or even tolerate these practices,
because of their relative novelty. Yet, perhaps public policy considerations should
direct the rabbinic leadership to encourage their practice – for they are bona fide
opportunities for unmediated rituals that many women crave. This would seem to
be the thrust of R. Ahron Soloveichik’s146 comments regarding kaddish yetoma:
Nowadays, when there are Jews fighting for equality for men and
women in matters such as aliyot, if Orthodox rabbis prevent women
from saying kaddish when there is a possibility for allowing it, it will
strengthen the influence of Reform and Conservative rabbis. It is,
therefore, forbidden to prevent women from saying kaddish.
In a similar spirit, the outstanding American posek, R. Joseph Elijah Henkin writes:147
It is known that were it not for kaddish, many would refrain from
teaching prayer to their sons and would not come to synagogue. When
they come because of kaddish, they also come a bit closer to Judaism
the rest of the year; and for that reason itself, one should not rebuff
the na’arot [girls] either, since it fosters closeness to Judaism.
(d) Optional Mitzvot: Jewish tradition and law are replete with examples where
women have traditionally been careful about fulfilling time-determined
commandments despite their exemption from them. Thus, women are universally
careful about hearing shofar blowing, and most hear parashat zakhor, shake lulav
and sit in a sukkah. Yet, it is rare for women to bring a lulav to shul for Hallel; nor
is it customary for them to parade around a central bima in the ezrat nashim for
hoshanot and few attend the synagogue for Hoshana Rabba – despite its High
Holiday content. Why is the rabbinate complacent about having the women remain
spectators? Why don’t they use these opportunities to spiritually enrich the lives of
their female congregants? Women are encouraged to attend shul Shabbat morning;
why is not the same true for Shabbat minha and ma’ariv and for the daily minyan?
In many a weekday minyan there isn’t even a mehitza available should women
want to attend.
haRav Kook, 5765/2005) (Sinai, 68, pp. 135-36), pp. 271-349, at p. 341 and note 306. See
also the collection of articles at: http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/tfila/kadish/legufo-2.htm.
146 R. Ahron Soloveichik, Od Yisrael Yosef Beni Hai, end of sec. 32, p. 100.
147 R. Joseph Elijah Henkin, Kitvei haGri Henkin, II, Teshuvot Ibra, sec. 4, no. 1; see also
R. Chaim Pinchas Scheinberg, cited in Ta’arikh Yisrael, supra, note145; Resp. Iggerot Moshe,
O.H., V, sec. 12, no. 2.104
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(e) Torah Study: By the turn of the last century, in a world of social, political
and moral upheaval, it became eminently obvious that extensive education was the
only real way to assure the transmission of Jewish values and knowledge.148 This
has led to what is unquestionably the most radical change to have occurred in the
past century, and most dramatically in past thirty years: the explosion in women’s
education.149 In the modern period, women have available to them educational
opportunities that are on an extremely high level. We also live in a more affluent
society, which allows young adults to spend more time in higher learning – Jewish
and secular – before they get a job and establish a family. Kolelim for women are
no longer a fantasy. For many women, limud Torah is the most genuine and satisfying
form of an unmediated source of spirituality. Indeed, the Sifre and Maimonides150
view Torah learning as one example of “service of the heart.”151
Nevertheless, women, who see their future in Torah scholarship, sense that the
road is an uphill battle. If we encourage our daughters to pursue a career while
raising a family, why can’t their career be Torah learning and education? There is
a need for the Orthodox community to encourage its women in their pursuit of
higher Torah studies, much as we do for our men. We need it for the spiritual health
of our women and our community at large. What could be a louder message to the
next generation than to see how both parents sacrifice time for Torah? We must
allow talented women not only to learn for themselves, but to interact with the
community at large – through teaching, lecturing, researching and publishing. The
introduction of to’anot rabbaniyot (women advocates in the rabbinic courts), first
trained by Midreshet Lindenbaum, testifies to the ability of qualified women to
master Jewish family law. Similarly, Nishmat, under the leadership of Reb. Chana
Henkin, has trained several classes of yo’atzot halakhah (women halakhic advisors)
to give rulings in the laws of family purity. This novel institution has proven to be
a real success and of great value. This course of study should be expanded to the
laws of kashrut, mourning and medical ethics – indeed, to whichever areas these
scholars view appropriate. There will also be a need for certification of advanced
study, and proper titles that reflect this new-found competence.
(f) The Aguna: The problem of the aguna (a tied, chained or anchored wife), a
woman whose husband has disappeared and is presumed dead, has been handled
with great wisdom and sensitivity in the past. The recent case of the tragic collapse
148 R. Haym Soloveitchik, “Rupture and Reconstruction: The Transformation of Contemporary
Orthodoxy,” Tradition, 28:4 (Summer 1994), pp. 64-130.
149 Shoshana Pantel Zolty, supra, note 94.
150 Sifre, Piska 41; Maimonides, Sefer haMitzvot, Esei 5.
151 Deut. 11:13.105
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of the World Trade Center Twin Towers152 proves that such is the situation in our
day as well. However, the issue that is of greater concern in our day is the “chained
wife” whose recalcitrant husband is alive and refuses to give her a get.153  Such a
woman cannot halakhically remarry, and often lives a life of anguish and despair.
This is not a feminist issue – nor should it be presented as such, lest it be marginalized
and politicized. The greater prevalence of divorce in our times and, consequently,
the increasing incidence of contemporary agunot, invests the situation with new
urgency. It is imperative that the problem be confronted with astuteness and
compassion by rabbis today.
Unfortunately, in the Diaspora, there is little way of compelling a recalcitrant
husband to give a religious divorce. In Israel, the theoretic legal power that rabbinic
courts have, to sanction a husband who refuses to give a get, is rarely applied.
Instead, the rabbinical courts engage in haggling – often pressuring the woman to
give up property or even child support to secure the get – thereby granting legitimacy
to the husband’s extortion tactics.  Sadly, there are no magic solutions to this problem.
Nonetheless, there is a value in publicly admitting that a crisis exists.  Solutions
tend to appear more quickly when the community-at-large raises the alarm.
VI. Conclusion
In her rich and impressive interdisciplinary work, Prof. Tamar Ross has explored
many divergent fields of scholarship in an attempt to understand the points of
152  See R.Gedalia Dov Schwartz, “beHeter Agunot sheBa’aleihem Ne’evdu beHitmotetut Migdal
haTeomim,” HaDarom, 72/73 (Elul 5762), pp. 63-72; R. Mordechai Willig, “She’eilah
beInyan haAgunot meAson Migdalei haTe’omim,” Kol Tzvi (Yeshivat Rabbenu Yitschak
Elhanan), IV (5762), pp. 3-13; R. Ovadiah Yosef, “Heter Aguna me‘Migdalei haTeomim’
beNyu York,” Tehumin, XXIII (5763) pp. 97-109 – this responsum first appeared in Kol Tsvi
(Yeshivat Rabbenu Yitschak Elhanan), IV (5762), pp. 44-63; R. Zalman Nehemia Goldberg,
“Heter Agunot me‘Migdalei haTeomim’ beNyu York,” Tehumin XXIII (5763) pp. 110-124 –
this responsum first appeared in Kol Tzvi (Yeshivat Rabbenu Yitschak Elhanan), IV (5762),
pp. 14-35 and 41-43 with comments by R. Menachem Senderovic, ibid., pp. 36-40; R.
Chaim Jachter, “The Beth Din of America’s Handling of the World Trade Center Agunot,”
Gray Matter, Vol. II (Brooklyn, New York: Yashar, 2006), pp. 114-38; R. Jonas Prager,
Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society (Fall 2002).
153 For some general reviews, see R. Judah David Bleich, “The Agunah Problem,” in J.D.
Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol. 1 (New York: Ktav. 1977), pp. 150-59;
R. Shlomo Riskin, Women and Jewish Divorce: The Rebellious Wife, the Agunah and the
Right of Women to Initiate Divorce in Jewish Law (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1989). R. Michael J.
Broyde, Marriage, Divorce and the Abandoned Wife in Jewish Law (New York: Ktav, 2001);
R. Chaim Jachter and Ezra Frazer, “Grappling with the Problem of Agunot,” Gray Matter –
Discourses in Contemporary Halacha (Teaneck, NJ: privately published, 2000), pp. 1-59.106
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conflict between feminism and Orthodox Judaism. This book makes it eminently
clear that these worldviews have divergent sets of values, goals and expectations.
The author has attempted to present a new theological approach that she believes
will bridge the gap between these different weltanschauungs and allow unabashed
feminism to coexist with Orthodoxy. This reviewer believes that Ross has,
unfortunately, failed to attain the goal she set out to do. Firstly, the theology presented
in this volume is clearly at odds with a number of basic tenets and principles of
faith that have characterized Orthodox Judaism over the millennia. Secondly, the
work fails to fully appreciate the nature and dynamic of the halakhic process, as
well as the vastness, richness and depth of the rabbinic literature.
Indeed, where feminism and Halakhah can coexist with integrity, it behooves
contemporary rabbis to take the steps to make room for those women who find
“feminist” practices meaningful and significant. However, where a value choice
must be made between feminism and Torah Judaism, an Orthodox Jew, bound by
a divine and immutable Torah and committed to the halakhic process, must be
prepared to be religiously and intellectually honest and choose the latter.
This message has been insightfully captured by recent comments of R. Aharon
Lichtenstein.154 In response to the child’s query “What is this service to you?”
(Exodus 12:26), the Torah replies: “You shall say: It is a Pesach offering to God,
Who passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, when He struck the
Egyptians and saved our children, and the nation kneeled and prostrated themselves”
(Exodus 12:26, 27). The Torah’s answer seems unintelligible, almost unrelated to
the question. However, on closer examination, argues R. Lichtenstein, we find
here a fundamental lesson.
The parents’ answer relates to the commandment of  “Pesach dorot,” the Pesach
sacrifice brought in future generations, which was dramatically different from the
original celebration in Egypt. Thus, in this statement, we are effectively telling our
children that there is room for innovation and change where necessary, in accordance
with a shifting reality; the commandment of the Pesach sacrifice in fact symbolizes
this adjustment. However, we must also bear in mind the final words of the verse:
“And the people kneeled and prostrated themselves.” Change is often essential,
and the great Torah sages throughout history have applied Halakhah to the new
circumstances and conditions of each generation. But, underscores R. Lichtenstein,
all of this can only occur with the clear proviso that it is undertaken with complete
commitment to Halakhah: its obligations, values and principles.
154 R. Aharon Lichtenstein, “What is This Service to You?” – talk delivered at Seuda Shelishit,
Shabbat Parashat Bo 5765 (2005) at Yeshivat Har Etzion; notes available online at:
http://vbm-torah.org/archive/sichot66/15-66bo.htm/.